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     This thesis discusses the concept of internality in the postwar Okinawan 
literature of Kiyota Masanobu and Medoruma Shun. Whereas traditional approaches 
to Okinawan studies presuppose an external power such as sovereignty, this thesis 
examines the attempt to foreground an internal power within the self so as to unmoor 
Okinawa from the traps of sovereignty. It does this by first examining writings of the 
philosopher who first conceptualized the “multitude” as a form of communality that is 
not organized by sovereign power, that is Baruch Spinoza. With Spinoza’s concept of 
conatus, the first part of this thesis provides close readings of Kiyota Masanobu’s idea 
of a primordial “hunger,” affirmative recuperation of “defeat,” the dream of a “we” 
(bokura), and the repetition of “repatriation and escape” to a commune. 
 The second part addresses the literature of Medoruma Shun through Michael 
Hardt and Antonio Negri’s concept of constituent power, Walter Benjamin’s “Critique 
of Violence,” and most importantly, Frantz Fanon’s development of interiority amidst 
colonial struggle. Through this theoretical framework, it provides close readings of 
violence and sexuality in Medoruma’s “Hope” and Rainbow Bird. 
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Introduction 
     This thesis develops the notion of interiority in the works of two postwar 
Okinawan writers, Kiyota Masanobu (1937-  ) and Medoruma Shun (1960-  ). The 
first section addresses the critical essays and poetry of Kiyota who wrote 
predominantly during the reversion era from 1952 to 1972. Intensely disillusioned 
with party politics that divided Okinawa at the time, Kiyota reacted by attacking 
assumptions about the instrumentality of politics and language that serve to achieve 
the goal of commun and communication. Instead, he attempted to develop a new 
grounding for existence that is animated by dream for a commune through 
performative poetic expression irrespective of the “success” or “failure” to actualize it 
in reality. The second section addresses two short stories, “Hope” (“Kibō”) and 
Rainbow Bird (Niji no Tori), written by Medoruma in the post-reversion era. In a 
similar vein as Kiyota, Medoruma articulates what he calls the “natural and necessary” 
in order to point to a philosophy that does not look to an external force to ground its 
reason, but instead cultivates reason for itself. In this way, he intimates not with the 
end of reason but with its means. A close reading of their writings reveals the 
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possibility of a new kind of force field generated from within that has the power to 
attract a multitude of people irrespective of political divisions. It furthermore 
underscores how alienation is not something to overcome, but a means that enable us 
to engage in our everyday reality. That is to say, it is the very stuff that enables us to 
become critical thinkers. 
     In order to lay the groundwork for this meditation on the literature of Kiyota and 
Medoruma, the below section provides a rough sketch of postwar Okinawan history in 
relation to the problem of exteriority in order to contextualize both authors focus on 
developing notions of interiority.   
1. Against a (Literary) History of Externality  
     Okinawa’s postwar literary movements are a reflection of Okinawa’s vexed 
historical relationship with sovereignty. Although never legally designated a “colony,” 
the Ryukyu Kingdom underwent drastic assimilation policies similar to those in 
Taiwan and the Korean Peninsula after it was integrated into the territorial sovereignty 
of the newly formed Japanese nation-state as Okinawa Prefecture in 1879. After the 
Pacific War, Japan lost its colonial acquisitions via the 1945 Potsdam Declaration, but 
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Okinawa was once again left hanging in a geopolitical vacuum. That is, while many 
former colonial subjects of the outer territories (gaichi) of Taiwan, Korea, and beyond 
celebrated their independence from Japanese colonial rule, and national subjects of the 
inner territories (naichi) of Honshu, Hokkaido, Kyushu, and Shikoku were vested with 
Japanese sovereignty, Okinawa’s disposition was left undesignated. 
     This non-place amongst sovereign nations set the stage for the shimagurumi 
tochi tōsō, or “all-island land struggle” from 1952-1958. An all-encompassing protest 
exploded when the US military was compelled to provide justification for land 
confiscation intended for military base construction after the promulgation of the 1952 
San Francisco Peace Treaty. This Treaty is most commonly known as the pivotal 
moment when Japan regained its sovereignty, but it simultaneously functioned to put 
Okinawa’s ambiguous geopolitical disposition temporarily at bay with Secretary of 
State John Foster Dulles’s assertion that Japan retained “residual sovereignty” in 
Okinawa.1 Dulles’s ingenious manipulation of the juridical language of sovereignty 
                                                
1 Evan N. Sarantakes, Keystone: The American occupation of Okinawa and US-Japanese relations, 
(College Station: Texas A&M University Press, 2000). 
   4 
allowed the US to avoid charges of colonialism classically understood as a usurpation 
of territorial sovereignty by claiming Okinawa’s sovereignty, albeit temporarily 
suspended until maturation, “residually” resided in Japan. However, despite Dulles’s 
juridical acrobatics, many Okinawans still insisted that the US confiscation of land 
amounted to outright colonization of the island. Indeed, proposed “compensation” was 
only 1/10 of the real value of the land; sale of the land was forced; land was 
confiscated at gunpoint as symbolized by the phrase “bulldozers and bayonets.”2  
     The “all-island” opposition to land confiscation uniformly voiced across the 
political spectrum became marred with factionalism as soon as the US military recast 
the struggle in geopolitical terms. That is, in 1956 the US military cracked down on 
protest through censorship and economic sanctions by asserting it spawned communist 
activity. As a result, a “pro-American” faction dependent on revenues from the base 
economy was pitted against a “pro-Japanese” faction that officially launched the 
reversion movement (fukki undō) back to the Japan as a way to escape the purported 
infringement of its territorial sovereignty.  
                                                
2 Arasaki Moriteru, Sengo Okinawashi, (Tokyo: Nihon Hyoronsha, 1976). 
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     While the pro-American/pro-Japanese binary is commonly assumed to exist in a 
relation of opposition,3 a more critical examination reveals that they are mutually 
reinforcing because they both take for granted the notion of sovereignty in Okinawa. 
On the one hand, pro-American Okinawan business owners parroted US military 
rhetoric of democracy and free market capitalism—there were no complaints of 
sovereignty violated there. On the other hand, when Dulles formulated the notion of 
“residual sovereignty,” he actually set the stage for the pro-Japanese reversion 
movement—even as the movement was considered “anti-American” by the US 
itself—because he cemented the assumption that colonialism cannot be present where 
sovereignty resides. The reversion activists hastily took for granted the notion that if 
only Okinawa could enjoy full protection of Japanese sovereignty, then it would be 
released from the draconian colonialism of the US military. However, as the post 1972 
reversion present suggests, even though Okinawa’s sovereignty was restored to the 
Japanese administration, Okinawa’s dream for liberation was never realized because 
                                                
3 Arakawa Akira, Izoku to Tennō No Kokka: Okinawa Minshūshi E No Kokoromi, (Tokyo: Nigatsusha, 
1973). 
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the proportion of US military bases in the island actually increased while they 
decreased in mainland Japan.4 Today, 70% of all US military bases in the Japanese 
state are concentrated in Okinawa, although it only makes up 0.6% of state territory, 
and the Japanese government foots nearly 70% of the bill to keep them there under the 
auspices of “Host Nation Support.”5 Okinawa still remains in a vexed position vis-à-
vis territorial sovereignty and begs for a new mode of articulation for its geopolitical 
condition. 
     In this way, this thesis fundamentally challenges the assumption that a 
recuperation of sovereignty is equivalent to decolonization. It refuses to see 
Okinawa’s problematic relationship with sovereignty in terms of a lack of sovereign 
power that can be filled through repatriation, and instead fundamentally problematizes 
the definition of the political as the transfer of power from the people to an external 
source of sovereign authority. Under such an assumption of the political, the potential 
to act or to speak is reduced to its effectiveness as a means to achieve the final end of 
                                                
4 Arasaki Moriteru, Sengo Okinawashi, 45. 
5 Gavan McCormack, Client State: Japan in the American Embrace, (New York: Verso, 2007). 
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sovereign recognition. Different from writing and treatises on Okinawa’s political 
economy, this thesis shows how the development of a thought that sought to avoid the 
traps of sovereignty emerged in postwar Okinawan literary movements.  
      The preponderance of pre-existing research on postwar Okinawan literary 
studies conventionally starts with a focus on activism surrounding the well-known 
literary journal University of the Ryukyus Literature (herein “Ryūdai Bungaku”) that 
sprung up amidst the all-island land struggle and dominated the cultural scene during 
the occupation era (1945-1972).6 In 1956, Ryukyu University students involved in the 
journal were expelled and publication of the journal was suspended under pressure 
from the US military because their participation in the land struggle made them 
suspect for engaging in “communist activities.”7 Because of this tumultuous history, 
literary scholars most commonly read the poems and short stories that flourished from 
this publication as “resistance literature.”8 Indeed, amongst the three main members, 
                                                
6 Okamoto Keitoku, Gendai Okinawa no Bungaku to Shisō, (Naha: Okinawa Taimususha, 1981). 
7 Miyazato Seigen, Amerika no Okinawa tōchi. (Tokyo: Iwanami shoten, 1969). 
8 Bhowmik Davinder, Writing Okinawa: Narrative Acts of Identity and Resistance, (London: 
Routledge, 2008), Shinjō Ikuo, Okinawa bungaku to iu kuwadate: kattōsuru gengo, shintai, kioku, 
(Tokyo: Inpakuto Shuppankai, 2003). 
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socialist realist poets and essayists such as Arakawa Akira and Kawamitsu Shin’ichi 
attempted to use literature as a tool to resist against US military colonialism.  
     While Arakawa and Kawamitsu are canonized in postwar Okinawan literature, 
an equally important third member of Ryūdai Bungaku named Kiyota Masanobu has 
been categorically ignored. During the reversion movement, Kiyota severely criticized 
Arakawa and Kawamitsu’s reduction of literature to politics and participation in the 
reversion movement. He furthermore saw through the factionalism amongst New Left 
activists and writers during the reversion era as symptomatic of the pitfalls of party 
politics.  
      This thesis aims at turning a new leaf in both Okinawan politics and literary 
studies starting with the pivotal intervention made by Kiyota at the juncture of 
Okinawa’s reversion era (1952-1972). Through his critical essays and poetry, Kiyota 
exposed a debilitating reliance on externality across Okinawa’s philosophical 
landscape. Put into broad historical contextual terms, this is certainly the external 
power of a theological God who turns into a political sovereign power with the 
emergence of the nation-state system. And certainly, from the brief historical 
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explanation provided above, we know that Okinawa is perpetually suspended in a state 
of exceptionality in regards to sovereignty. But for Kiyota more locally, this is 
expressed as a politics that uses language as a tool or means to achieve a greater end 
such as liberation from colonial power. That is to say, acts or language understood in 
terms of their mediality towards a greater goal is predicated on a form of the subject 
that sets its sights on the attainment of something outside of it—an external goal to be 
realized in the future. Obsessed with attaining a final goal, social movements across 
Okinawa once again became subjugated by an external power and left severely 
compensated in their ability to harness a force that has always already existed within 
Okinawans from the beginning. Okinawans became marred with factionalism before 
the law or institutions from which they sought recognition and left bereft of the ability 
to theorize a different mode of subject formation that develops a power for itself 
internally.  
     This is a rough sketch of the provocative intervention of Kiyota, who, soon after 
Okinawa’s reversion to the Japanese administration in 1972, quickly faded from 
Okinawa’s literary scene. Not only Kiyota, but a number of writers and activists 
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around him as well fell silent. In term of postwar Okinawan history, the period 
between 1972 to 1995 certainly corresponds to a relative era of complacency. With the 
implementation of the “Okinawan promotion and development regime” or shinkō 
taisei that accompanied its integration into the Japanese administration, Okinawa 
briefly witnessed economic developments on the island. However, it soon became 
clear that these so-called “developments” aimed to subjugate Okinawa under Japanese 
capitalism while simultaneously secure it as the locus of mainland Japan’s unwanted 
US military bases. It was under these conditions that the anti-base movement re-
emerged in a renewed form in 1995 with the rape of a twelve-year-old girl by three US 
military personnel.  
     Enter Medoruma Shun. Born in 1960, Medoruma was only twelve-years-old 
when Okinawa reverted to the Japanese administration. He grew up hearing stories of 
the Okinawan War and also reading writings from the reversion era. As an heir to 
these contexts, his literature circulates from this postwar past to the post-reversion 
present with a vivid philosophy of violence that does not appeal to recognition of an 
external power such as the state, but rather harnesses the power of violence for a 
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development of the internality of the subject. While Medoruma certainly won the 
prestigious Akutagawa Prize in 1997 for his story “Droplets,” his philosophy of 
violence nonetheless has been grossly misunderstood in literary criticism precisely 
because of the lacuna in Okinawan literary history that starts with Kiyota’s occlusion.       
     Today, the Japanese government is attempting to force construction of a new US 
military base onto Henoko, Okinawa despite constitutional protections on the 
autonomy of local municipalities in the Japanese state. Since 1995, it has become 
increasingly obvious to a majority of Okinawans that Okinawa continues to be made 
an exception to equal protection under Japanese law. Although Kiyota has vanished 
from the world of letters, Medoruma now participates in direct actions to oppose 
construction of US military bases in Okinawa and has endured physical confrontations 
with the riot police. The aim of this thesis is to recuperate a pivotal moment in postwar 
Okinawan literary history so as to deepen thought on the external power of 
sovereignty as Okinawa struggles with the recurring same today.  
2. General Outline of the Thesis 
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      This thesis is broken down into two parts: Kiyota Masanobu in Part 1 and 
Medoruma Shun in Part 2. Each part is framed through a theoretical argument.  
     In order to foreground the possibility of a performative kind of political and 
linguistic act that is not predicated on a teleological means-end relationship, I start 
Chapter 1 with the source of contemporary discussions on the “multitude”: Spinoza’s 
conatus. This frames close readings of Kiyota Masanobu’s work in Chapter 2 on the 
potentia of “hunger,” affirmative readings of the meaning of Okinawan “defeat,” the 
dream of a “we” (bokura), and repetition of “repatriation and escape.”  
     Both Spinoza and Kiyota’s work carry over to Part 2 that examines the literature 
of Medoruma Shun. However, more explicit than Kiyota, Medoruma meditates on the 
potentia of violence unfettered by the state that attempts to monopolize its power. 
Hence, Chapter 3 starts with a theoretical consideration of Michael Hardt and Antonio 
Negri’s constituent power, Walter Benjamin’s “Critique of Violence,” and most 
importantly, Frantz Fanon’s development of interiority in colonial struggle. This 
frames close readings of Medoruma’s “Hope” in Chapter 4, and Rainbow Bird in 
Chapter 5.   
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Part I  
Kiyota Masanobu and the Reversion Era 
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Chapter 1 
Spinoza and Conatus 
     Different from Arakawa Akira’s poetry that vividly depicts an unmistakably 
racialized landscape of US military occupation in Okinawa through poems such as 
“The Colored Race,” Kiyota’s poetry makes intensely abstract allusions to neutral 
phenomena in nature such as the night, sky, birds, and ocean. Certainly, this may 
frustrate readers who are looking to read characteristically “Okinawan” poetry because 
it is devoid of descriptive markers of an so-called Okinawan historical experience. In 
this sense, it is not surprising that Kiyota’s poetry has been regarded as opaque and 
has not enjoyed much international acclaim.  
     As we shall see, however, Kiyota was indeed responding to a historical context 
which was both experienced in Okinawa, but yet not strictly limited to this 
geographical context. It was Kiyota’s intense alienation from party politics during the 
reversion era that drove him deeper and deeper into the realm of abstraction in order to 
ground a new sense of being through the performative act of poetic expression. There 
is no immediate clarity in his poetry that allows readers to recognize a specificity 
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through which they are to receive instructions on a recommended plan of action. That 
is to say, Kiyota became increasingly critical of instrumental notions of language that 
purported to speak to a community that is assumed will “get” an intended message. 
For Kiyota, this instrumental notion of language prevalent in socialist realist trends in 
postwar Okinawan poetry were of the same register as instrumental notions of the 
party seen as a vehicle of a consolidation of political wills that seeks to triumph over 
an existing power. To situate Kiyota theoretically, this predicament may overlap with 
Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri’s development of the multitude in the sense that 
Kiyota was also highly skeptical of the assumption of a collective political will 
expressed through sovereign power of the state or party, and instead invested his 
energies in dreaming of a collective “we” (bokura) of singularities.  
      The purpose of this section is to return to the foundational theorist of the 
multitude—Spinoza—with reference to Judith Butler’s writings on the same in order 
to contextualize Kiyota’s poetry as a performative act of writing that attempts to 
dream of another form of community.  
   16 
      In Senses of the Subject, Butler turns to Spinoza’s concept of self-preservation 
to think of a form of community that is not predicated on the notion of a pre-existing 
homogeneity of its members. She asks, “what conceptions of the ‘self’ and of ‘life’” 
are presupposed by self-preservation?9 This “self” or “life” is predicated on what 
Spinoza calls “conatus” which he  
defines as follows: 
The conatus with which each thing endeavors to 
persist in its own being is nothing but the actual 
essence of the thing itself.10 
Here the “conatus…persists in its own being” and seems to point to a power that 
emerges internally from within the subject. It is, as Spinoza writes, “nothing but the 
actual essence of the thing itself.” Its emanation from the self is rooted in a different 
relationship between the self and God. For Spinoza, humans are put alongside other 
phenomena in nature, and hence, conatus is an expression of the self’s potentia as part 
                                                
9 Judith Butler, Senses of the Subject, (New York: Fordham University Press, 2015), 64. 
10 Benedictus de Spinoza, ‘Ethics’ in The Essential Spinoza Ethics and Related Writings, Edition: 
Michael L. Morgan, Translation: Samuel Shirley, (Indianapolis and Cambridge: Hackett Publishing 
Company, Inc 2006), 66.  
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of God or nature. He writes, man “follows the common order of Nature, and obeys it, 
and accommodates himself to it as far as the nature of things demands.”11 In this 
sense, Spinoza starts with the proposition that humans live in unavoidably un-free 
conditions in which they are placed alongside phenomena in nature. This is radically 
different from an Enlightenment subject who is free to make choices in the world.  
     However, Spinoza’s emphasis on the un-free conditions serve to ground a 
different notion of potentia. He explicitly frees potentia from a means-end relationship 
and causality; man’s relationship to phenomena in nature is not one in which he can 
use something as a means to achieve an end or use something as a means to realize a 
final goal. This is because, for Spinoza, God is absolute in the sense that he did not 
create the world in order to fill it with things that he lacks. In contrast to a view of a 
purposive God that assumes that “God acts with an end in view” in order to seek 
“something that he lacks,” Spinoza asserts “God’s perfection.”12 This is central to the 
                                                
11 Ibid., 107. 
12 Ibid., 26. 
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development of conatus because it points to a force that is part of nature but internal to 
the self, but yet does not operate according to a means-end or causal relationship.  
     By circumventing the means-end or causal relationship, Spinoza offers a 
different temporality of the subject. First, as Gilles Deleuze has pointed out in his 
study of Spinoza: 
God does not produce things because he wills, but 
because he is. He does not produce because he 
conceives, conceives things as possible, but because 
he understands himself, necessarily understands his 
own nature.13 
Here, Deleuze’s language makes a contrast between the action of “willing” and a state 
of being that simply “is”: “God does not produce things because he wills, but because 
he is.” In this way, Deleuze points to Spinoza’s assertion of the simultaneity of 
knowing and producing. God does not make something in order to fulfil a lack; he 
                                                
13 Gilles Deleuze, Expression in Philosophy: Spinoza, Translation: Martin Joughin, (New York: Zone 
Books, 1992), 104.  
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does not acknowledge a lack and then aim to fulfil it through purposive action. The 
difference between A and B in terms of causality cannot be reduced to a measurable 
conception of time. Instead he points to the eternality of God as a final end. It is in this 
sense that knowing and producing take on a sort of performative meaning that does 
not presuppose an end to ground its act beforehand. As well shall see later, this is 
integral to Kiyota’s performative poetic expression. 
     Second, this points to Spinoza’s notion of singularity. Because Spinoza 
circumvents a temporality presupposed by causality, A cannot become B through time. 
That is to say, A and B are two incommensurable singularities incapable of 
substitution. As Spinoza writes, “Things could not have been produced by God in any 
other way or in any other order than is the case.”14 In this way, potentia is not the 
potential for A to become B as a triumph over contingency through the tenacity of a 
human will. Rather, potentia is a force that does not look elsewhere for its realization; 
it is a force that simply “is.” Conatus, hence, is precisely the eternal modality of 
                                                
14 Benedictus de Spinoza, The Essential Spinoza Ethics and Related Writings, 33. 
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humans which seeks to fulfill this desire of God or nature. Butler articulates this sense 
of imagining (or what Kiyota will call “dreaming”) in relation to potentia as follows: 
Actually, what the self does, constantly, is imagine what a 
body would do or does do, and this imagining becomes 
essential to its relation to others. These imaginary 
conjectures are not simple reflections, but actions of a 
certain kind, the expression of potentia, and in that sense, 
expression of life itself. This means that the way that we 
represent others to ourselves or the means by which we 
are represented to ourselves by or through others 
constitute expressive actions by which life is augmented or 
diminished. In representing others as we do, we are 
positing possibilities and imagining their realization. Life 
stands the chance of becoming enhanced through that 
process by which the potentia of life are expressed.15    
                                                
15 Judith Butler, ‘Spinoza’s Ethics under Pressure’ in The Desire to Live, (New York: Fordham 
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Important in this passage is not the realization of the goal, but potentia as a particular 
expression of life itself. The imaginary does not present things as they are, but it 
expresses a life force that exists in and of itself.  
    Indeed, Spinoza’s notion of conatus may appear to be so focused on the 
singularity at the cost of considering the relationship with the other. However, as 
Butler shows, this is a misreading of Spinoza. Self-preservation operates on one level 
as a conatus that is eternal and complete and on another level as the desire to preserve 
oneself, or in other words, the singularity of the body. In other words, the self is 
always catapulted into a relationship with other singularities as an expression of its 
conatus, but depending on how well the self is received or not received by others, the 
conatus can be “augmented or diminished.” As we shall see in Kiyota’s poetry, this is 
the departure from one singularity to the repatriation to another. What is important is 
that the conatus constantly animates the dream for a commune that occurs in 
performative speech. However, the actuality of commune is constantly thwarted by the 
singularity. What Spinoza offers, therefore, is not a utopia free of struggle, but another 
                                                
University Press, 2015), 66.  
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way of positing struggle. Conatus is the force that propels humans who live amidst un-
free conditions to seek to overcome hardship. What is important is not whether they 
“win” or “lose,” or in other words, the realization of desire in concrete terms, but 
rather, the performative expression of this force itself.       
  
   23 
Chapter 2 
The Party and Kiyota Masanobu’s Poetic Expression 
1. Hunger 
     Kiyota Masanobu is a crucial yet neglected figure in postwar Okinawan literary 
history who saw through the constraints of party politics during the 1950s-1960s in 
both Okinawa and Japan. Kurihara Sachio describes the zeitgeist of the reversion era 
Okinawa as an absolute loss of faith in the “ultimate political party”—the Japanese 
Communist Party (JCP)—that acted as a catalyst triggering widespread “turning 
point” amongst activist groups such as the Zengunrō (Zen Okinawa Gunrōdōsha 
Kumiai, All-Okinawa Military Workers Union) and Beheiren (Betonamu ni Heiwa o 
Shimin Rengō, Citizen’s League for Peace in Vietnam). Kurihara reflects on this era in 
following way: 
I suspect that in the critique of Stalinism, it became 
clear that it was not just a problem endemic to the 
JCP, but rather a universal phenomena…The biggest 
problem was not with the particular manner of politics 
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per se, but with the character of the “party.” My 
personal experience leads me to this conclusion.16  
In this way, Kurihara starts to consider alternatives for movements that resist party-
line consolidation, but can still mobilize variegated masses of people. In this way, 
Kiyota similarly attempted to conceive of a different kind of social formation with 
others. For some readers, this discussion may certainly overlap with Michael Hardt 
and Antonio Negri’s concept of the multitude in the sense that it is concerned with the 
politics of masses of people who are multiple, variegated, and whose force cannot be 
measured in advance.17 Kiyota’s writing suggests not only the contradictory nature of 
the “party” that supposedly represents the people while simultaneously oppressing 
them, but also the widespread disillusionment towards movements carried out under 
its pretenses. Instead, Kiyota throws into question what exactly is occluded and 
obliterated when political subjects are represented by the “party.” If a new kind of 
thought born out of the flight from vanguard parties of the 1960s emerged in tandem 
                                                
16 Kurihara Sachio, “Tenki o Junbi shita Mono: Goku Shitekina Kaisō kara” in Impakushon, no. 59 
(1989): 18-19. 
17 Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri, Empire (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2000). 
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with Kurihara’s account of widespread “turning point,” then Kiyota is clearly its 
embodiment.  
     In 1956, the Price Report silenced the “four principles for land protection.”18 
Thereafter, the “all-island land struggle (shimagurumi tochi tōsō)”—a people’s 
movement that protested expansion of US military bases—spread through Okinawa’s 
main island like wildfire, and elevated anti-military sentiment. Prominent 
historiographers, such as Arasaki Moriteru, have positively interpreted it as “a 
comprehensive retaliation to ten years of US military domination.”19 This 
interpretation holds true even as they recognize the all-island struggle was also a fight 
for better terms on their land leases. However, other interpretations have placed 
significantly greater emphasis on this will to negotiate with the US military over 
                                                
18 After the US administration of Okinawa was formalized by the 1952 San Francisco Peace Treaty, the 
USCAR (United States Civil Administration of the Ryukyu Islands) realized it needed to establish 
private land leases in order to permanently secure Okinawa as a military fortress of the Pacific. It first 
attempted to give individual landowners a one-time lump sum payment for their land. Because of the 
miniscule compensation, 98% of the landowners promptly refused to sign leases. After constant 
encroachments on private land, Members of Parliament uniformly passed the “four principles for land 
protection” on April 30, 1954. These four principles stipulated: 1.) no lump sum payment; 2.) adequate 
compensation for land already confiscated; 3.) reparation for damages incurred; 4.) no additional land 
acquisition. Two years later in June 1956, the US House Armed Service Committee issued the “Price 
Report” that justified permanent lease of the land, lump sum payment of rent, and additional land 
acquisition, thereby directly violating the “four principles.” It was this momentous Report that triggered 
the all-island struggle.  
19 Arasaki Moriteru, Sengo Okinawa-shi, 147. 
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portraying Okinawans hotly engaging in a recalcitrant protest of US military 
domination. For example, the historian Toriyama Atsushi argues that the emergence of 
the land struggle came as a result of the Price Report betraying the expectations of a 
cooperative relationship with the US military that could be achieved through financial 
aid—aid necessary for the development of Okinawan autonomy.20  
     In response to the all-island struggle, the US military decided to take 
“preventative measures to avoid clashes between Ryukyuans and American GIs.”21 
They issued an indefinite off-limits order in the middle region of Okinawa’s main 
island, causing local municipalities, whose economies were dependent on military 
bases, to successively declare that they would not permit any “anti-American” 
gatherings so they could avoid all-out confrontations. Thereafter, the all-island 
struggle quickly dispelled. Students of the University of the Ryukyus who participated 
in demonstrations—particularly members of the underground communist party formed 
                                                
20 Toriyama Atsushi, “Hatan Suru <Genjitsushugi>--‘Shimagurumi Tōsō’ eto Tenka Suru Hitotsu no 
Chōryū” [The Collapse of ‘Realism’: One Current that Transformed into the ‘All-island Struggle], in 
Hōsei Daigaku Okinawa Bunka Kenkyūsho Ed., Okinawa Bunka Kenkyū, no. 30 (Tokyo: Hōsei 
Daigaku Shuppankai, 2004), 138-148. Refer to this paper for more research on political trends in 
Okinawa at the time that attempted to form a cooperative relationship with USCAR by exerting control 
over the way in which Okinawa’s municipalities attempted to conceive of their future prospects.  
21 Arasaki, Sengo Okinawa-shi, 150-160. 
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under the leadership of the Okinawa People’s Party (Okinawa Jinmin-tō, OPP)—were 
totally suppressed. Leaders of demonstrations were expelled from school, and student 
activism totally collapsed.  
     During the all-island struggle, Kiyota was a student of the University of the 
Ryukyus Department of Japanese Literature. His participation in the underground 
communist party through a student organization informed his writing on the total 
collapse of student activism after the defeat of the land struggle in the essay, “A 
Watershed of Poetry and Experience” (“Shi to Taiken no Ryūiki”). He prefaces the 
piece with the words, “In order to make possible a vision for tomorrow, it is absolutely 
necessary to trace the path of a miracle” and continues to reflect on the aftermath as 
follows: 
I must confess, during the time of the first 
general uprising, I engaged in conversation with 
friends from my student organization about the 
future. I truly believed in the feeling of solidarity 
making up the foundation of our praxis even 
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amidst our uncertain trials and tribulations…And 
then a series of shattering events: the expulsion 
of seven members of the executive branch of the 
student organization from the university; the 
voter league’s triumph at the mayoral election; 
the abrupt suppression from USCAR; the 
suspension of publication for University of the 
Ryukyus Student Literary Magazine. At that 
point, students who refused to go to class and 
became hermits in their lodgings, and students 
who busied themselves earning credits towards 
graduation were uniformly compelled to feel the 
sheer force of politics.22  
                                                
22 Kiyota Masanobu, “Shi to Taiken no Ryūiki” [“A Watershed of Poetry and Experience”] Ryūdai 
Bungaku [University of the Ryukyus Student Literary Magazine] vol. 10, no. 2, (Naha: Ryukyu Daigaku 
Bungei-bu, 1980): 47]. 
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Having faced defeat of the all-island struggle on the one hand, and incapable of 
developing a critique of Stalinism on the other, Kiyota lost hope in both the OPP that 
continued to cooperate with the JCP, and his fellow students who blindly followed 
their party politics without question. Kiyota hence defected from the party early in 
1958.23 At this same time, he joined the editorial collective for University of the 
Ryukyus Literary Magazine, and launched his career as a writer in the journal. He also 
published the literary coterie magazine Origins (Genten) in 1959 with Okamoto 
Sadakatsu, Irei Takashi, and Nakazato Yūgō, and Poetry/Reality (Shi/Genjitsu) with 
Okamoto Sadakatsu, Kochinda Keiten, Matsuhara Nobuhiko, and Miyahira Akira after 
graduating from the University of the Ryukyus. It was Poetry/Reality that became 
Kiyota’s primary medium of expression after graduation. He states the following 
about the publication: 
                                                
23 Justification for the early 1958 date of Kiyota’s defection can be found in Kiyota’s assertion that, “It 
has been a few months since criticism of the JCP by the AJLSSG (Zengakuren) and defection took 
place, and a year has gone by since the Okinawan anti-Yoyogi organization split off into a different 
faction because of individuals who finally defected in response to instructions from mainland. Kiyota 
Masanobu, “Tanigawa Gan-ron” [“On Tanigawa Gan”] in Shi/Genjitsu [Poetry/Reality] vol. 5 (Naha: 
Shi/Genjitsu no Kai, 1968): 16.  
   30 
Amidst the reorganization between the Bund24 and the 
Revolutionary Marxist Faction (Kakumaru), all members of 
the University of the Ryukyus Literary Magazine defected 
from the party. In the meantime, the unified progressive 
voter’s league (minren) were betrayed by the rightward 
swing of the mayor they had painstakingly campaigned for 
and successfully got elected, the increasingly coalescence 
between civil society and institutions, and the emergence of 
another conservative mayor in 1961. In order to continue the 
act of thinking under those circumstances, we decided after 
much debate that the only thing we could do was create a 
magazine. Hence, in 1962, we published the literary coterie 
magazine Poetry/Reality.25  
                                                
24 Bund comes from the Japanese Bunto which is derivative of the German Bund. It is also referred to 
as Kyosanshugisha Dōmei in Japanese, or Communist League in English.  
25 Kiyota Masanobu, “Okinawa Sengo Shi-shi” [“A History of Postwar Okinawan Poetry”] Okinawa 
Bungaku Zenshū [Complete Works of Okinawan Literature] (Okinawa Bungaku Zenshū Henshū Iinkai, 
1992), 207. 
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 Having lost all hope in politics and organizations as a result of the pacification of 
student movements, party reorganization, and the betrayal of the OPP, Kiyota was left 
for the time being completely bankrupt theoretically. Then, as if to work out an 
ineffable problem, Kiyota’s writings almost obsessively repeat criticism of the all-
island struggle, vanguard parties, student movements of the 1950s, and reorganized 
student movements of the 1960s. 
     Amidst such a change in the times, Kuroda Kio—a poet from a Tōhoku farming 
village—bore enormous influence on Kiyota. Kuroda, who had befriended Kiyota, 
published his essay “Shi ni Itaru Kiga Anniya Kō” [“Hunger Which Leads to Death: 
Thinking about Anniya”] in 1964. Anniya is a man with ancestors who “live 
subservient in another’s service; a man who cultivates another’s land without having 
his own arable land.”26 As a man who lives at the bottom of the social hierarchy, he is 
a visible man who can be seen by anyone in the sense that he bears the mark of 
discrimination. Wherever or however he is when he is born or dies, “he is never called 
                                                
26 Kuroda Kio Shi to Hanshi Kuroda Kio Zenshishū Zenhyōronshū, (Tokyo: Keisou Shobou, 1968), 
147. 
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upon in the absence of such a word that was attached to this name.”27 Anniya is 
characterized as a person who has been starving for his entire life, a person who is 
possessed by an incurable hunger sickness (kigashō), or in other words, a person who 
is permeated with lack throughout the entirety of his life.  
     Kuroda describes the figure of anniya in a discussion on agrarian land reform 
which took place in his village after World War II. In his account, the vanguard party 
regarded the reform as revolution. A certain “peasant T” and a certain “secretary K” of 
the agricultural land commission followed along with their support of the party. Both 
“peasant T” and “secretary K” were anniya. They were both “lifetime patients of the 
hunger sickness; typical ‘anniya’ who tried to escape being anniya at the risk of their 
lives,”; “men who continued to struggle for invisibility from others at the risk of their 
lives.”28 In other words, anniya attempted to climb up out of a deep hole called hunger 
in order to escape their present predicament. Kuroda takes issue with this not because 
                                                
27 Ibid., 49. 
28 Ibid., 155. 
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he sees the attempt to climb up the social ladder as a problem. Rather, the problem lies 
elsewhere. 
They were not only obsessed with hunger and tried 
to climb out of the deep hole, but they also denied 
the entirety of the hole itself both on the inside and 
out. Since they were thoroughly conscious of 
themselves as anniya, they easily became members 
of an organization that tried to deny the whole of 
which created them.29 
Kuroda goes on to problematize the party that denied the deep hole itself called hunger 
which catapulted “peasant T” and “secretary K” toward revolution. In other words, for 
the party, hunger is posited as an object that should be denied and eliminated. 
However, Kuroda struggled to point out that it was also an important moment that 
enabled anniya to transform themselves from visible men to invisible men which is a 
moment that should be maintained without erasure. This is a contradictory double 
                                                
29 Ibid., 157. 
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hunger in the first sense of being afflicted with actual hunger and in the second sense 
of being denied the life force enabled by hunger. Kuroda continues: 
They should not have been obsessed with starvation in 
order to climb up and succeed in life as anniya. They 
needed a sort of moment (弾機) in which they could 
leap to a world of values (kachikan) that reverses a 
lifelong upward mobility as anniya. This moment is 
created by absolutizing their inner ancestral sense of 
hunger.30  
Kuroda’s discussion comes into focus with reference to Butler’s reading of Spinoza. 
She maintains that desire, which is usually treated as a mere means to obtain 
recognition, should rather be posited as “a desire that can find no satisfaction, and 
whose unsatisfiability establishes a critical point of departure for the interrogation of 
available norms.”31 What is important here is the conatus, or the presence of desire 
                                                
30 Ibid., 160. 
31 Judith Butler, Giving and Account of Oneself, (New York: Fordham University Press, 2005), 24. 
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itself irrespective of whether or not it realizes its goals. Kuroda likewise establishes 
hunger as absoluteness replete with revolutionary philosophical possibility. Hunger is 
not merely a process in need of elimination. It becomes a means that should absolutely 
be held onto when making a leap toward the revolutionary world, or in Kuroda words 
“a world of values (kachikan) that reverses a lifelong upward mobility as anniya.” 
However, vanguard organizations regard such starvation as satisfied remnants to be 
thrown away in the past. This is what the vanguard party betrayed.32 
     In response to Kuroda’s essay, Kiyota published “Kuroda Kio Ron I Hakyoku o 
Koeru Shiten” [Essay on Kuroda Kio I: A Viewpoint beyond Catastrophe] in Ryūdai 
Bungaku, Vol. 3, No. 8. In this essay, Kiyota argues that in contrast to the context 
from which Kuroda writes, what enabled solidarity amongst student activists of the 
1950s and 1960s in Okinawa was a common “doctrine that attacks land expropriation 
and direct administration.”33 Hence, he doubts if the type of peasant starvation 
depicted by Kuroda could serve as moment that critically deepens the students’ 
                                                
32 Regarding this point, refer to the following text. Tomiyama Ichiro, “Yūtopiatachi Gutai ni 
Sashimodosu Koto”, in Posuto Yūtopia no Jinruigakuai, eds. Ishizuka Michiko, Tanuma Sachiko, 
Tomiyama Ichiro, (Kyoto: Jinbushoin, 2008), 314-376. 
33 Kiyota Masanobu, Jojō no Fuiki, (Tokyo: Okisekisha, 1981), 32.  
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thoughts.34 In other words, for Kiyota, Kuroda’s writings on hunger is relevant as a 
critique, and not as affirmative praise of the all-island land struggle. The land struggle 
was reduced to and trivialized as a struggle over the private land owning rights of the 
peasants, thereby rendering it impossible for the peasants’ starvation to emerge as 
catalyzing agent for revolution. The revolutionary possibilities of hunger were 
swapped out for a politics of monetary compensation that operate through petitioning 
subjects, or subjects whose effectiveness is measured through their ability to petition 
for a quantifiable monetary sum. Moreover, Kiyota not only criticized students who 
took on the leadership of the organization, but also villagers or peasants with whom 
students tried to forge alliances. 
     Regarding such peasants, Kiyota pointed to the conspicuous land struggle that 
took place on Ie Island in March 1955 in his essay “Shi ni Okeru Shisha to Kōi” that 
was published later in December 1964. Peasants, whose houses were burned down by 
the US military in the expropriation of their lands, had nowhere to go and sent 
representatives to submit a petition to the Ryukyu Government where many conducted 
                                                
34 Ibid., 32.  
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a sit-in. In the middle of such a land struggle, Kiyota writes “I’m not the only one who 
is puzzled” in response to the following placard: 
America belongs to America 
Okinawa belongs to Okinawan 
Maja belongs to Maja village 
Even heaven knows this principle 
America should know God’s awe”35 
While Kiyota recognizes that “perhaps the self-assertion of peasants in dire straits can 
only encapsulate their outlook with such words,” he nonetheless critically discusses 
the “exclusionary” elements of the “peasants” in the following way:   
When peasants say “America should know God’s 
awe,” they lost the energy to get angry at the 
Americans, avoided the object they should struggle 
against, and became desperate… These desperately 
organized peasants were pitifully absorbed into a 
                                                
35 Ibid., 223. 
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system of petition in which they ascended up and 
away from rather than descended deep down into a 
community…When the Yanbaru [region] 
consolidated and petitioned, they unintentionally 
divided solidarity between laborers and peasants. 
By admonishing the Americans to fear God’s awe, Kiyota suggests that the peasants 
sought protection behind a shield. This in turn deflected them from directly 
confronting the “object they should struggle against.” Through this deflection, Kiyota 
emphasizes that they were deprived of a vital energy of anger, and hence, became 
absorbed into a politics of means and ends that goes by the name of a “system of 
petition.” In this way, they “ascended up and away” towards an external power, which 
deprived them of the ability to “descend deep down into a community.” Kiyota’s gaze 
“deep down into a community” resonates here with Kuroda’s attempt to locate a 
“world of values that reverses a lifelong upward mobility as anniya.”   
2.  “Owning Defeat” in the 1960s 
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     As indicated by friends surrounding Kiyota, his obsessive critique of the 
vanguard parties and student movements of postwar Okinawa aimed to theoretically 
grasp the meaning of “defeat (haiboku)” amongst those who yearned for 
decolonization. For example, the Okinawan poet Shinjō Takekazu writes:  
Through the political transformations of the 1960s, it 
became apparent to us that the self-proclaimed vanguard 
party (i.e., the JCP) was nothing but an errant myth. Their 
vanguard thinking collapsed, and they quickly lost all 
authority formerly attained by sporting a façade of 
progressiveness. No literary thinker could escape this 
profound historical tragedy for it was pounded into the 
depths of their consciousness. Slammed with heavy 
waves of defeat (haiboku) and total breakdown (zasetsu), 
diligent thinkers could not help but ask themselves the 
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painful question, “What is real thought (shin no shisō 
towa)?”36  
 Directly after this quote, Shinjō indicates that it is Kiyota who is one of these 
“thinkers who took on this troublesome topic.”  
     By identifying the point where political transformations of the 1960s were 
“[s]lammed with heavy waves of defeat and total breakdown,” Shinjō is not merely 
depicting a hard-to-accept loathing of the situation, but rather he is pointing to Kiyota 
as one of the few “diligent” thinkers who is willing to productively dwell on it. For 
example, in the following 1963 roundtable discussion on the location of thought and 
literature in the wake of another power regime that dominates over Okinawa, Kiyota 
responds to Kawamitsu Shin’ichi’s statement, “We need to amass greater strength to 
stand up against reality,” by stating, “It is okay for literature to be defeated by reality,” 
“the literati are always in a losing battle against reality,” and “the strong do not write 
literature.”37 Kiyota means that compared to the occupation forces that boast of 
                                                
36 Shinjō Takekazu, Fuka to Teni [Burden and Transference] reprinted in Myaku Hakkōjo, 1993, 57. 
Quotations are taken from the reprinted version when revisions have been made to original 1970 text.  
37 Kiyota Masanobu, Kochinda Keiten, Shima Shigeo, Matayoshi Makoto, Kawamitsu Shin’ichi, 
Okamoto Sadakatsu, Tanaka Yū, “Zadankai Bungaku no Jiritsusei ni tsuite” [“Roundtable Discussion: 
On the Autonomy of Literature” Ryūdai Bungaku [University of the Ryukyus Student Literary 
   41 
absolute superiority in material and human resources, “we (bokura)” can never 
compete in numbers. In face of the “reality” of such a discrepant balance of power, 
“we” are “always on the losing side.” In response to this “reality,” Kawamitsu retorts 
that Okinawans “must not lose.”38 There is no doubt that Kawamitsu is indeed 
politically correct—his views are quite commonplace. However, the point is that he is 
utterly incapable of accepting the fact of defeat. For Kawamitsu, the process of defeat 
must be sublated and victory must be reestablished as goal. The defeated is always a 
minority. 
     If political subjects must be represented by institutions, and “victory” is posited 
as a struggle between institutions, then “defeat” is an unavoidable certainty. Why? 
Because defeat entails the failure to achieve absolute representation, alienation from 
the public sphere, and hence, the condition of being made into an unrepresented Other. 
Kiyota, however, attempted to positively recuperate the meaning of “defeat.” He was 
“diligent[ly]” attentive to those who were defeated by movements and who lost the 
                                                
Magazine] vol. 3 no. 4 (Naha: Ryukyu Daigaku Bungei-bu, 1963): 51. 
38 Ibid., 51. 
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grounding (konkyō) to their existence as a result thereof. The frequent appearance of 
those who took their own lives, those who went insane, those who defected from 
social movements, and those who could not fit into civil society all vividly attest to 
Kiyota’s concerted attempt to stay in conversation with subjects who elude 
representation. It was this fertile ground from which he attempted to forge the 
possibility of a new politics.39 
     At the same time, this is the very ground from which the problem of poetic 
expression emerges. If defeat entails a failure of a subject to be represented by 
institutions (i.e., alienation), and if lack entails the realm that eludes representation, 
then how is it possible for people to go on living branded with this mark of lack? Just 
as Kiyota attempted to add another dimension to defeat, he adds another dimension to 
lack. For Kiyota, it is imperative that those branded with the mark of lack create new 
                                                
39 To the present date, Kiyota has been regarded as a poet who separates literature from “politics.” 
However this type of uni-dimensional understanding of “politics” risks confusion and misunderstanding 
when considering Kiyota’s thought. “Politics” as used during Kiyota’s time of writing, and “politics” as 
it has been re-defined within recent trends in modern thought, clearly emerge from different contexts. 
For this reason, it is important to separate the two. The former refers to the party-line politics that 
locates human desire within institutions or an a priori subject. In this conceptualization, human desire is 
interchangeable with institutions or subjects represented by institutions. In Kiyota’s context, this kind of 
“politics” specifically refers to vanguard parties and Stalinism. The latter sense of “politics” refers to 
the realm of excess that emerges when people’s desires fail to completely assimilate into institutions or 
subjects represented by institutions. It is important to keep in mind that the former sense of “politics” 
was prevalent when Kiyota quit the vanguard parties around 1960. Since he rejected the “politics” of 
the former, confusing the two senses of “politics” risks misconstruing Kiyota’s thought. 
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meaning in their lives in order to keep on living. It is this very process that Kiyota 
attempts to ground in the act of poetic expression. In the face of defeat, Kiyota 
problematized the construction of political subjects who are imprisoned in a value 
system of victory versus defeat in order to foreground a new meaning of life: “Defeat, 
victory, and domination are yoked together into the same trinity and operate within a 
uniform dimension.”40 Rather, the act of writing poetry for Kiyota was to “take defeat 
and victory above and beyond to the next dimension.”41 If the defeated (haibokusha) 
are branded with lack when compared to the victors, then Kiyota was determined to 
reject this schema, and actively invest himself in the position of the defeated in a way 
which resists an understanding of them as “simple loser[s].”  
When a writer intentionally descends upon defeat, he is not 
a simple loser. By willing defeat, he owns his defeat. Those 
who own their defeat are those who are able to objectify 
it.42  
                                                
40 Kiyota Masaki, “Ketsueki no Metafijikku” [“The Metaphysics of Blood”] Ryūdai Bungaku 
[University of the Ryukyus Student Literary Magazine] vol. 3 no. 7 (Naha: Ryukyu Daigaku Bungei-bu, 
1966): 40. 
41 Ibid., 40.  
42 Kiyota Masanobu, “Obuje eno Tenshin” [“Reincarnation into Objet”] Ryūdai Bungaku [University of 
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Here, “owning defeat” is not read as lack on the part of the defeated or Other. It is not 
so much a loathing of subjectivication or subjugation to the party (shutaika=jūzokuka) 
that Kiyota seeks to avoid, but rather a move to affirmatively become the defeated. 
The individual transforms into an objectified Other on his/her own accord.  
Instead of fearing being made into objet, one becomes objet 
on his own accord. It is precisely in this space of excess 
where the subject faces ruin that the conditions for human 
existence are pursued.43  
Like Spinoza, Kiyota places the individual alongside other phenomena in nature and 
finds possibility in becoming the objet. Kiyota terms the rejection of subjecthood, and 
the pursuit of a new and unknown existence the “reincarnation into objet.”44 
According to the Okinawan poet Miyagi Hidesada, “In Kiyota’s poetry, existence 
yearns after difference (found in woman). Breathing life into existential language, he 
allows language to soar amidst uncertainty.”45 Similarly, the Okinawan poet 
                                                
the Ryukyus Student Literary Magazine] vol. 3 no. 1(Naha: Ryukyu Daigaku Bungei-bu, 1961b): 41. 
43 Ibid., 41. 
44 Ibid., 41. 
45 Miyagi Hidesada, “Ikarosu no Gōka—Moeru Erosu to Shizumeru Tanatosu” [“The Hellfire of 
Ikarosu: Burning Eros and Calming Thanatos ”] Myaku [Pulse] vol. 49 (Naha: Myaku Hakkō-jo, 1994): 
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Matsubara Toshio states, “Poetry and thought (shisō) for Kiyota was not so much 
about political transformation as it was about a transformation in existence.”46 Both of 
these commentators point out the burning obsession with existence and the aching 
desire to be reborn into the existence of the Other found in Kiyota’s poetic expression. 
In one of Kiyota’s representational works, “Poetry of a Man Called Crawdad,” he 
again rejects subjecthood, and affects an air of nostalgia for existences that escape 
representation.  
At the instance when things start to crumble 
through a crack in the pipes laid bare in the ruins  water secretly 
spews out.  
Trembling with the presentiment of reincarnation  the dreaming 
soil is wet. 
 
                                                
6. 
46 Matsubara Toshio, “Haikyo no Shigami Kiyota Masanobu-ron,” in Guntō, no. 49, ed. Miyagi 
Hidekazu, (Naha: Guntō Dōjin, 1974): 19. 
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Even in an insentient night  the journey of negation and 
affirmation is bleak.  
Beyond the green mob, the kitchen, and the spinning wheel 
drowning out the voices of young revolutionaries,  
Will the seeds sprout out from the ruins of an annihilated self?  
It is clear that for Kiyota in this poem destruction is not a moment for regret, but one 
of possibility. Hopes channeled through the narrow confines of a pipe are offered new 
life through the pipe’s decay as “water secretly spews out” of its cracks. This passage 
ends with a question, “Will the seeds sprout out from the ruins of an annihilated self?” 
and is careful to allow the reader to answer this question for him/herself, thereby 
circumventing the structure of a poem that instructs.     
     In his own reading of the poem, Shinjō Takekazu writes that it represents 
…ambition towards reincarnation into a new life 
that renders the given grounding of reality’s 
existence a complete façade…It dreams of a self 
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that is brought back to life into a world that is 
anywhere “other than here.”47 
Takekazu suggests that as Kiyota dreamed of being reincarnated into the defeated, he 
attempted to search for meaning or a grounding for existence from the “ruins of an 
annihilated self.” This dream and desire for a new existence was the very basis that 
grounded Kiyota’s act of writing. It animated him and was the driving force that 
ignited his poetic expression. Kiyota’s thought that bore aspirations for new existence 
from the position of the defeated is also depicted in the poem, “Maturity” composed in 
April 1962.   
As if thrown away and suspended at the far end of the sky 
we must walk the realm of an unfathomable night  
until we speak the words suspended within us (bokura).  
Are the screaming voices within the far distance 
                                                
47 Shinjō Takekazu, “Zarigani to Iwareru Otoko no Shihen” [“A Collection of Poems by a Man Called 
Crawdad”] Hassō [Notions] no. 4 (Naha: Okidai Bungaku Kenkyū Kai, 1970): 64. 
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palatable to the bird of the future? 
Beyond the unbearable anxiety 
the forgotten wishes 
are like treetops that have tried to sprout only to decay: 
When shall its rotting be laid bare? 
From a sleepless age brimming with darkness 
the silhouettes of our (bokura) souls are laid bare  
and fall into an unfathomable depth.  
One woman crouches up, and from her shaking of a distant ocean 
our (bokura) sleep is exposed by a somnambular ocean.  
Even if light does not allow for a deluge of memories, 
breasts would not freeze up the water vein of a rose.  
To gradually help nurture the color of sadness so it can become 
unclouded language  
we (bokura) must walk the realm of an unfathomable night.  
With the soft feel of the west wind, 
   49 
let us wait for a language that can be spoken from our lips. 
Let us lay bare our (bokura) own existence.48 
Kiyota does not flinch at the never-ending circle of thought concerning what grounds 
the act of writing at the very moment where one begins to write about a given object 
or condition. Rather, he imposes onto himself the question, why should one even write 
despite the fact? It is the desire to meet the unknown Other that drives Kiyota to write. 
The Other for Kiyota is the defeated, the dead, and any other existence that eludes 
representation by political parties or institutions. The Other is the realm of excess that 
results when subjects cannot be perfectly contained by institutional representation. In 
order to meet the Other, Kiyota, from the inner depths of his unconscious, starts the 
act of description: “we must walk the realm of an unfathomable night/until we speak 
the words suspended within us (bokura).”  
     For Kiyota, the point where one begins to write should not be locked in a fixed 
position, but it is the “realm of the unfathomable night” that expands limitlessly within 
                                                
48 Kiyota Masanobu, Kiuyota Masanobu Shishū Hikari to Kaze no Taiwa (Tokyo: Shichosha, 1970), 
98-99. 
   50 
“our” (bokura) unconscious. This chaotic “realm of night” lies beyond the “afternoon” 
where everything is rendered visible under the bright sun of day; it is the ground that 
conditions the act of writing. Here, the act of thinking with words that grounds writing 
is the very driving force behind the writer’s thought and description. It is this very act 
that continually brings the existence of the writer into life.  
     Kiyota embraces the “realm of the night” where he eagerly awaits “for a 
language that can be spoken from our lips”—this awaiting for fruition is the dream of 
“maturity” as the title suggests. Importantly, Kiyota overlaps the grounding (konkyō) 
of an incomplete act of writing with the existence of the writer in the “here and now.” 
If performatively partaking in the dream of “maturity” signifies “writing,” then writing 
and living for Kiyota take on the same meaning. Language is not merely a means for 
transmitting information, but it exhibits characteristics of a living creature that acts. In 
the process of delving deeply down into the grounding of a single existence expressed 
by the “I (boku),” it becomes the “we (bokura)” that may be encountered when 
“maturity” is achieved. In this sense, he continues to foresee the dream of a coming 
community.  
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     It is this “we (bokura)” that Kiyota discusses in detail in the critical essay, “The 
Dead and the Act within Poetry” (“Shi ni okeru Shisha to Kōi”), which appeared in the 
1964 edition of University of the Ryukyus Student Literary Magazine.  
It is impossible to immediately render the inscription 
of experience into a poem. The inscription of 
experience has nothing to do with our (bokura) 
thought. Likewise, to the extent that experience is the 
material that is spoken of, people will be limited to 
being informed about their experience…While being 
informed of an event, we become accustomed to the 
event, and when it has been rendered ex-post facto, 
[we] will have already taken hold of the security of 
our livelihood.49   
                                                
49 Kiyota Masanobu, “Shi ni okeru Shisha to Kōi” [“The Dead and the Act within Poetry”] Ryūdai 
Bungaku [University of the Ryukyus Student Literary Magazine] vol. 3 no. 5 (Naha: Ryukyu Daigaku 
Bungei-bu, 1964). 
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This essay is a direct critique of the historicism that systematically organizes 
occurrences a posteriori as an “informed experience” or “informed event.” This 
historical critique, however, soon gives way to recondite poetic language as he 
describes the act of poetry below.   
     Any experience that is brought into the public 
realm is made into a one-liner catch phrase. The hidden 
meaning within experience is forgotten without ever 
being brought to light. More precisely, it is impossible 
to bright to light experience at the horizon of the public 
realm. In the depths of an [individual] self’s memory—
when vision is absorbed into the pitch darkness of the 
eye—the pose of crouching up at the loss of words is 
precisely what will be uncovered as bearing a deep 
rhythm within the shadows of experience in which [we] 
are unavoidably made to call [ourselves] a “we 
(bokura).”  
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     Expression is action that is ushered into the 
difficult-to-name solid body that harbors rhythm. When 
we jump onto that rhythm as we are drawn into the 
rustling depths of its shadows, we strongly grab hold of 
the sense (kankaku) of the wide expanse inside the 
dazzling “present” in which we locate only ourselves as 
the cause. If the zone that renders expression palatable is 
stretched across the dimension where the tranquility of 
the clear intellect and intense red delusion are made to 
coexist, then living the fluidity brought about by 
departure (ridatsu) as we are enticed into that zone is the 
act (kōi) of poetry.50  
 If the subject of speech, “we (bokura),” is posited a priori, then the act of living by 
language will inevitably run into a dead end. Kiyota attempts to live language as an act 
that exists within the uncertain undulations and sense of crisis of the writer who does 
                                                
50 Ibid., 34-35. 
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not know now whether or not he will ever arrive at a “we.” The point here lies entirely 
in the sense of suspension, or unpredictability in being able to arrive at the “we 
(bokura)” as the “matured” “I (boku),” while simultaneously keeping the next course 
of action entirely open ended. Unpredictability entails that nothing has been decided in 
the future, and any possibility is open for play; it entails “strongly grab[bing] hold of 
the sense (kankaku) of the wide expanse.” When writing possesses the duality of 
possibility or impossibility of the reality of “we” in the “present,” the “we” continues 
to live on as an allegorical expression.  
     By directing the “screaming voices within the far distance” to an outward 
direction, it does not become “palatable” for the “bird of the future.” He does not point 
to a direction where a sense of crisis is immediately dissolved, just as he does not 
allow the chaotically screaming voices to carefully choose words that narrow in on a 
target. Instead, “words suspended within us” or the phrase “let us wait for a language 
that can be spoken from our lips” becomes an indicator of an act yet to come in the 
future. Here, just one step before the scream, Kiyota brings to life the possibility for 
the expression of a “we.” However, most importantly, the unleashing of the scream 
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does not occur. Even if there is “anxiety” in continually watching the “rotting” that 
occurs when the day of “maturity” does not come, and even if there is an irritation that 
incites the writer to state, “When shall it…be laid bare?”, the unleashing of the scream 
is strictly prohibited. Rather, the nonexistent “we” is continually left in tact in the 
“pose of crouching up at the loss of words” while the “I” continually lives alongside 
irritation and a sense of crisis. “Let us lay bare our (bokura) own existence.” When 
language has been used up to allow the “screaming voices” to roar, and when the 
sense of crisis that has been completely absolved, the writer loses his or her grounding 
as a writer. At that point, language in waiting dries up and dies.  
     Performative expression that attempts to bring something into existence that has 
not yet taken on the existence of “we” is a far call from a pre-established harmony 
predicated on knowing in advance whether or not a possibility will consummate into a 
reality. Only through the persistent act of quietly securing a dream in the “here and 
now” can the writer find the grounding that makes the existence of the writer possible. 
Beginning to throw into question what grounds the subject of enunciation, i.e., 
pursuing the unknown Other, is already a political act. In order to look forward to a 
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new future different from the present, Kiyota stood steadfast, crouched up, and waited 
eagerly for “something” to happen. 
3. Repatriation and Escape  
     Kiyota’s “Repatriation and Escape” (“Kikan to Dasshutsu”) was written in 
September 1968, and appeared in the journal Notions (Hassō) published by the 
Okinawa University Research Group on Literature in December of the following year. 
In this essay, Kiyota develops his critique of the so-called problem of Okinawa’s 
territorial belonging (Okinawa no kizoku mondai). Importantly, this critique is written 
one year after the November 15, 1967 US-Japan Summit between Japanese Prime 
Minister Satō and US President Johnson where they announced “the date for reversion 
will be decided within the next three years,” and outlined the policy that would govern 
the handover of Okinawa’s administrative rights to Japan. Hence, Kiyota was writing 
as the curtain drew to a close on Okinawa’s reversion to Japan.  
     “Repatriation and Escape” describes Okinawa’s prewar experience of 
imperialization (kōminka), the massacre of Okinawan civilians by Imperial Japanese 
soldiers, the postwar call for Ryukyuan independence, the All-Okinawa Base Workers 
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Union (Zengunrō), and the rise of new movements in the 1960s that pined after 
reversion. By carefully folding each of these historical memories into the next, Kiyota 
conveys an overarching theme in which Okinawan’s attempt to survive modern 
oppression. Passing through the age of the Ryūkyū Kingdom, the age of Yamato 
(Japan), and the age of America, Kiyota depicts a cycle of departure (i.e., escape) from 
oppression, followed by an attempt to mobilize subjects into movements (i.e., 
repatriation). Once this cycle comes full circle, it starts again with the repeated 
pacification and subsequent attempt at building a movement. Despite the exhausting 
repetitiveness, Kiyota continues to inscribe his dream for Okinawan liberation. 
     When the problem of reversion is deployed, the 
question becomes, to where exactly are we to return? 
[In posing this question, we must first establish that] it 
does not matter if there is an escape (dasshutsu) by 
ones own accord from a homeland, or a forced exile by 
powers beyond ones control. It does not matter if there 
is an escape from present conditions, or an escape from 
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the homeland or from the state. Rather, to the extent 
that it is oriented as an escape, it is an act that suggests, 
implicates, and is complicit in the creation of a future 
(mirai ni katan suru).  
      Reversion and escape come together like two 
opposing arrows wedged up against each other in the 
shape of a V—the logic draws force from its 
intersecting point of tension, transcends “ethnic pride” 
(“minzoku kanjō”) that cries out for a return to the 
maternal bosom, and becomes a cite for transformation. 
Therefore, we do not return to the motherland (sokoku). 
A motherland that welcomes us like a mother is 
impossible. Even if we could imagine its possibility, we 
would end up being inhospitably greeted as a 
suspicious stranger, and not as people who escaped 
from [or were deprived of a belonging to] their 
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homeland…Thought (shisō) transforms them into a 
commune of common sensibility (kyōkan iki) and opens 
up the possibility for an unforeseen pathos (jyōnen). 
But what is this “motherland” anyway? There is no 
“motherland” for Okinawa to return to. Didn’t we lose 
a “motherland” when we were separated from Japan by 
the United States in 1946?51  
 The escape from military occupation brings forth a new repatriation called reversion 
to Japan. It is from these circumstances that Kiyota positions himself to call out a “we 
(bokura)” to the reader as seen in the poem “Maturity.” He writes, “Didn’t we lose a 
“motherland”? He identifies with the subject, departs from it, and then one step before 
departure, brings forth another identification. This is precisely the point where the two 
“come together like two arrows wedged up against each other in the shape of a V.” 
Departure from subjecthood provides the inertia for another identification. By 
                                                
51 Kiyota Masanobu, “Kikan to Dasshutsu” [“Repatriation and Escape”] in Hassō [Notions] no. 3 
(Okidai Bungaku Kenkyū Kai, 1969): 30. 
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recording this process, Kiyota does not let the dream of Okinawan liberation pass him 
by. In other words, the dream of liberation is expressed in the very act of inscribing 
the excess that results when departing (ridatsu) from subjecthood.  
     It is this process that Kiyota carefully unravels in an account of an incident that 
occurred in his home village on Kumejima Island. In “The Experiences of my Youth,” 
Kiyota writes of his encounter with an army deserter from mainland Japan who takes 
flight to his village, and an Okinawan soldier who returns to his village after a 
grueling battle at the end of the war. The US military has already occupied the village. 
Even though the deserter was from mainland Japan, he gave up his fight with the 
“enemy,” took cover in the Okinawan returnee’s home, and relied on the returnee’s 
mother and sister to nurse him back to health. When the Okinawan returnee learns that 
the Japanese deserter welcomed the end of the Okinawan War under these cushy 
conditions, he is enraged and attempts to kill him. It took his family and other villagers 
to convince the Okinawan returnee to quell his anger. After the US military retreated 
from the village, the Japanese deserter returned to Japan.  
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     The Okinawan returnee is angry because even though he threw himself into 
wartime mobilization out of the need to overcome Japanese discrimination towards 
Okinawans, the Japanese deserter makes the privileged assumption that the business of 
fighting the “enemy” is simply the natural thing to do and has the luxury of deserting 
the battle on his own accord. For the Okinawan returnee, his anger is a protest of this 
“betrayal.” Furthermore, these emotions exploded after the accumulation of other 
“betrayals,” such as the numerous civilian massacres at the hands of Japanese soldiers 
all over the island, and the Japanese military’s surrender to the US military directly 
after the civilian group suicides (shūdan jiketsu) that were informed by imperial 
Japanese ideology. This anger ruptures out of a fault-line created by the departure 
from subjectivication of “becoming Japanese.” It is important to note that it was 
Kiyota’s home island, Kumejima, where communications soldiers of the Navy First 
Sergeant Kayama Masa’s infantry massacred villagers on the pretense that they were 
“spies of the enemy.”  
     The deserter became the object of the returnee’s anger and violence becomes an 
internal killing “between people of the same nation.” Kiyota writes that, “What the 
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returnee tried to murder was the state. Once we can locate a logic capable of getting 
down to the main culprit of this act, then we can identify a new logic capable of 
critiquing the state.”52 Here, Kiyota does not advocate a re-production of state 
violence, nor does he quickly dismiss the violence of the returnee. Instead, Kiyota 
poses the question of what lies beyond the excess that results when dreams of people 
who gamble with subjectivication are destroyed, and when anger and violence 
overflow outside of the boundaries of the subject. On the eve of Okinawa’s reversion 
to Japan, it is obvious that the object of Kiyota’s critical thought is concerned with the 
whereabouts of this excess that occurs when an individual departs from subjecthood.  
     The military embodies the will of the state; the military is an organization that 
executes the state’s will. Hence, to desert the military is literally the greatest defiance 
of the state. The deserter in Kiyota’s account escaped (dasshutsu) from the state, and 
arrived in his village. However, the village was at the same time represented as a place 
where the returnee—whose broken dreams waged on the gamble of subjectivization 
caused him to secede from subjecthood—went home. In this way, the village takes on 
                                                
52 Ibid., 33. 
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a double meaning: it is the place that accepts those who escape from subjecthood and 
wander into the village, and it is the place where those who escape from subjecthood 
return to.  
     The experience of the returnee is representative of many phenomena where 
villages that cooperated with the Japanese military shifted to an anti-military stance as 
soon as they were “betrayed” by the Japanese military and found conflict inevitable. In 
each instance, there is a departure from subjecthood, and a return to another 
subjecthood. For example, in Tomiyama Ichirō’s analysis of how Okinawan civilians 
rose up in protest against the massacres by the Japanese military, he depicts their 
departure from being “Japanese” subjects. He notes that when the civilians took arms 
and prepared for anti-Japanese military struggle, discourse of the “Okinawan people 
(Okinawa minzoku)” suddenly emerged.53 In this sense, discourse of the “Okinawan 
people” as individuals who were subjectivized under another rubric after they departed 
                                                
53 Tomiyama Ichirō, Senjo no Kioku [Memories of the Battlefield] (Tokyo: Nihon Keizai Hyōron-sha, 
2006), 128-129. 
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from being “Japanese subjects,” and the village as a place of return for individuals that 
departed from being “Japanese subjects” of the Japanese imperial army, overlap.  
     Moreover, this echoes the emergence of a series of new postwar subjectivities. 
For example, the JCP proclaimed to “celebrate the independence of the Okinawan 
people”—a people whom they deemed “are ethnic minorities.”54 It echoes with the 
argument for Okinawan independence and the designation of the US military as a 
“liberation army” as they encroached upon Japan and Okinawa. According to Arasaki 
Moriteru, the argument for Okinawan independence and recognition of the US 
military as a “liberation army” was not limited to the purview of the JCP, but extended 
to the initial phase of the postwar OPP, and ODA (Okinawan Democratic Alliance). 
Moreover, the newly formed OPP went so far as to proclaim, “We are grateful to the 
US military that defeated the Japanese warlords and liberated Okinawans,” and 
“request monetary reparations from the Japanese government for war damages 
                                                
54 “A Message to Celebrate the Independence of the Okinawan People” was delivered by the JCP to the 
Okinawan Federation Convention. This Message was originally drafted at the 5th Japanese Communist 
Party Convention that took place on February 24, 1946. Here, the JCP makes clear their understanding 
of “Okinawans as an oppressed ethnic minority group [Okinawajin wa shōsū minzoku toshite yokuatsu 
saretekita minzoku dearimasu].” See Akahata, March 6, 1946. 
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incurred.”55 The departure/escape from wartime subjecthood calls forth the 
“Okinawan people,” “Okinawan independence,” and “US military liberation” as new 
political subjects of the postwar regime. Kiyota writes:  
There was no catharsis for the returnee, nor was there any 
liberation for the village. The meaning of this particular 
individual experience is representative of the lived reality in 
the postwar era. Rendering of the US military as a “liberation 
army” was clearly erroneous, and progressives in both Japan 
and Okinawa could not contain the experience of the village 
farmers, even if their thinking critical of the postwar reality 
held true…We (bokura) have been obstinately insisting on 
the following questions: To what degree is it possible to 
elucidate the irreducible feeling of belonging (kizokukan) to a 
                                                
55 Arasaki Moriteru, “Okinawa ‘Mondai’ no nijūyonen” [“The Okinawa ‘Problem’ of over Twenty 
Years”] Okinawa Mondai o Kangaeru [Thinking about the Okinawan Issue] Ed. Nakano Yoshio. 
(Tokyo: Taihei Shuppan-sha 1968), 26. After erecting a platform for independence, all political parties 
after proclamation of the Seven Principles of the San Francisco Peace Treaty (where Okinawa was 
severed from Japan), switched their platform to support reversion to Japan. Arasaki points out that a 
“critique of the platform for independence that preceded the switch to a platform for reversion (return) 
to Japan was insufficient.” 
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community overshadowed by the reality of the US-Japan 
Security Treaty? To what degree can it be organized?56  
For Kiyota, the excess of departing from subjecthood cannot be assimilated into the 
so-called “liberation army” or Japan. Rather, he attempts to problematize the structure 
of the subject itself that attempts to repatriate (kikan) to another locality after it 
escapes (dasshutsu) from its previous incarnation. Moreover, Kiyota theorizes the 
excess at the brink of subjectivication that is annihilated and forgotten. For example, 
the fact that the mother and sister cared for the deserter without reporting him to the 
US military does not entail their identification as a Japanese national subjects. This act 
does not signify a belonging (kizoku) to the nation, but rather points to the fact that 
their full existences elude representation as political subjects. Kiyota calls this kind of 
community where the village accepts the deserter and returnee at the same time a 
“primeval sentiment (genjōcho)”57  
                                                
56 Kiyota Masanobu, Jyōnen no Rikigaku: Okinawa no Shi Jyōkyō/ Ega [The Dynamic of Pathos, 
Poetry, Landscape, and Portrait of Okinawa] (Shinsei Tosho Shuppan, 1980), 349-350. 
57 Kiyota Masanobu, Jyōnen no Rikigaku, 33. 
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     Nonetheless, it is crucial to keep in mind that Kiyota is not suggesting that it is a 
mistake to repatriate or correct to escape from discrimination. Kiyota’s thinking starts 
with this fundamental assumption. Escape from predicament as repatriation is not 
given birth to after the new system of government comes into being. It exists in the 
heat of the moment of struggle as a simultaneity to acquire a new social system, or in 
other words, in the heat of the moment that seeks repatriation. The liberation of 
Okinawa as escape does not come after repatriation, but it is precisely within the 
process of repatriation.  
     As Walter Benjamin writes, “To articulate the past historically does not mean to 
recognize it ‘the way it really was.’ It means to seize hold of a memory as it flashes up 
at a moment of danger.”58 Benjamin suggests that the dreams of the defeated can once 
again come to life in our memories. If the past only means to “recognize it ‘the way it 
really was’,” then it is impossible to sense the harbinger of a new community that may 
come to be. It would appear as if there was only a history of oppressed non-resistance.  
                                                
58 Walter Benjamin, Illuminations. Trans. Harry Zohn. (New York: Pimlico, 1999), 255. 
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      Cries over “Okinawa’s destruction” that lamented Okinawa’s absorption into 
Japan emerged as the reversion movement began to crumble. The “anti-reversion 
argument” and “Okinawan independence argument” took on a renewed vigor as an 
immediate reaction to Okinawa’s previous state of affairs. However, whether the latest 
trend was represented by an argument for reversion, an argument against reversion, or 
an argument for independence, Kiyota uniformly rejected them all. Instead, he was 
able to detect at an early stage the limits of this kind of reactionary thought precisely 
because he could locate the point where defeat resists interpretation as a literal 
destruction or lack. Kiyota attempted to imagine a past that brought forth the present 
by confusing a linear temporality, and continued to dream of the possibility of another 
future—that of the “we.” “To seize hold of a memory as it flashes up at a moment of 
danger” is the indefatigable sharpening of a sense that can dream. The only way to 
resist against a true “defeat,” is to hone this new sense, and stroll through the making 
of a dream. 
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Part II 
Medoruma Shun and the Post-Reversion Era 
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Chapter 3 
Frantz Fanon and Violence 
1. To Riot 
     Like Kiyota, Medoruma is also critical of surrendering power to an externality 
such as the state, and instead seeks to develop a force internal to the subject for itself. 
More so than Kiyota, however, Medoruma focuses on unleashing the force of violence 
from the monopoly of the state and recuperating it as a life source or conatus for the 
subject. To start a theoretical meditation on such uses of violence, this section starts 
with a quote from Medoruma on the sociality of the riot in US military occupied 
Okinawa in 1970.  
“The MP (military police) tried to let an American who caused 
an accident run away, and then he fired a pistol ten times at 
protesting Okinawans…Those Okinawan could have died. 
Okinawans are not animals. Okinawans are also human beings 
god damn it!” 
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     Suddenly, behind the voice shouted by a riled-up young 
man, another man exclaimed “anyabīsa nīsan (you’re right, 
brother).” Judging from his voice, he was probably in his 
thirties or forties. Such were the sympathetic words uttered by a 
man who was listening attentively beside the young man trying 
to express his mind with words. Even though I have watched 
this famous scene many times, I was struck by the phrase 
“anyabīsa nīsan” when I watched it again.59 
In the middle of night on December 20, 1970, almost two years before Okinawa’s 
reversion to the mainland administration, a GI who was driving a car in Koza Okinawa 
hit an Okinawan man, causing him minor injury. Crowds of people who heard about 
the accident near the entertainment district gathered around the accident site and 
shouted, “Don’t let this turn into another Itoman!”60 They surrounded the Military 
                                                
59 Medoruma Shun, ‘Kiroku Sareta Koe’ in Okinawa/Kusa no Koe Ne no Ishi, (Yokohama: Seori 
Shobō, 2001), 29. 
60 In 1970, the same year of Koza riots, there was similar incident that occurred in Itoman, Okinawa. 
Toyo Kinjo was run over by a drunken GI when she was walking on the sidewalk. The suspect was 
found not guilty in a military court because no proof could be found linking him to the incident. It is 
said that the uproar in Koza which occurred right after the acquittal of the GI in the Itoman Incident 
added fuel to the already burning emotions of Okinawans who were frustrated with the US military.    
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Police (MP) to watch over they would handle the accident. Many Okinawans around 
the scene began protesting the uncountable crimes and incidents caused by GIs in the 
past that were committed with impunity. The GI who injured the Okinawan was 
transferred to Koza for the security reasons. Addressed by Okinawan police officers, 
the riled-up crowd had seemed to have been persuaded to calm down. 
     However, when a car driven by another GI crashed into a civilian’s car near the 
scene of the first accident, the situation became more chaotic. An MP fired a gun to 
startle the crowd, but far from cowering into submission, some started to display 
threatening behavior by shaking the MP’s vehicle. Then others started throwing stones 
at the MP, turning over American vehicles, and setting fire to them. This event is 
called the Koza Riot. 
     Civilians whistled in ecstasy and stood in joy before a legion of flaming 
American cars. Junior high school students handed over bottles full of gasoline to the 
rioters. A-sign bar workers who serviced GIs made their way to the scene. An old 
woman twisted her body and threw her hands in the air to dance the Okinawan 
kachashi. While it is estimated that hundreds were directly involved with the riot, it is 
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impossible to distinguish between people who were direct participants and people who 
were sideline observers. The number surrounding the scene is estimated to be in the 
thousands.61 
     Crucial to this passage is the fact that the rioters expressed their own anger 
without relying on the logic or language of activists or intellectuals. This means that 
they were free from their dependence on something external.  
     After the Koza Riot, political parties across the spectrum in Okinawa from 
progressive to conservative announced statements about the riot to assert their 
superiority over the others. At the same time there were people whose everyday reality 
failed to be captured by these political statements. They were people working in 
establishments dependent on the base economy who may have had negative feelings 
about eliminating bases, people involved in the sex industry, and even children who 
may have felt a sense of alienation from the anti-base movement. The unavoidable fact 
                                                
61 Refer to the following texts for a fuller picture of the Koza riots. Chizuru Isa, Enjō Okinawa Koza 
Jiken, (Tokyo: Bungeishunjū, 1986); Okinawashi Heiwa Bunka Shinkōka Henshū, Shashin ga Toraeta 
1970nen Zengo Koza Machi Koto Anata ga Rekishi no Mokugekisha, (Naha: Naha Shuppansha, 1997); 
Okinawashiyakusho Kikakubu Heiwabunkashinkōka Henshū, Okinawashishi Shiryōshū 4 Rokku to 
Koza Kaiteiban, (Naha: Naha Shuppan, 1998); Okinawashiyakusho Kikakubu Heiwabunkashinkōka 
Henshū, Beikoku ga Mita Koza Bōdō, (Gushikawa: Yuishō, 1999). 
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that we cannot dismiss is that people who were opposed to base removal were 
nonetheless involved with the riot in some way. No political faction and organization 
was able to represent the riot which goes to suggest that people expressed their rage 
directly by themselves without channeling it through the circuits of an external entity 
such as a political party. If we describe the riot as an event that is premised on vulgar 
notions of support or opposition to military bases, then we risk overlooking the 
imagination and possibility to think about people who want to oppose bases but do not 
feel disposed to be able to, or people who simply do not know what to do. 
 Ima Ikuyoshio, an activist who participated the riot, records his experience 
in Shin Okinawa Bungaku Vol. 50 published in 1981: 
I guess thousands of participants of the Koza Riot did not 
think that the US military forces and bases would disappear 
despite the fact that they set fire to yellow number license 
plated cars62 and broke through the second gate63. I did not 
                                                
62 This refers to private cars owned by the GIs.  
63 This refers to the Kadena US Air Force Base check point. 
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have such expectations myself. However, I can say that if 
we let that chance slip away, we would have had to lock 
away the smoldering resentment toward the US military in 
our hearts forever. Such intense consciousness enabled us 
to directly confront the US military and slap it with our 
resentment.64 
In Ima’s recollection, the rioters did not have any expectation that the bases would 
disappear. This, however, does not mean that they were resigned to the US military 
base presence either. When non-daily occurrences such as the riot removes itself from 
daily life regulated by a society occupied by the US military, the fear and terror 
associated with consequences of an intentional act start to dissipate. Reservations such 
as “What will happen to us as a consequence of the riot?” or “Won’t things get worse 
in the future as a result of the riot?” start to lose their holding power. The future 
already determined by the military occupation starts to crumble and opens up the 
                                                
64 Ima Ikuyoshi, “Koza Han Bei Boudou Kichi to Amerika wo Utta Rokujikanyo”, in Kawamitsu 
Shin’ichi Ed, Shin Okinawa Bungaku, No.50, (Naha: Okinawa Taimusu-sha, 1981), 130. 
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possibility for the multitude to seize its own undetermined future. The multitude 
becomes indifferent toward calculated thoughts.65 In this moment, the multitude 
becomes indifferent toward the law, which means that any lawmaking violence and 
law-preserving violence is stripped of its effectiveness. 
     As mythical violence loses its effectiveness, the possibility amongst those who 
want to oppose bases but do not want to now, and those who do not know what to do, 
starts to become palpable. They take back their own future from the occupier. Such a 
moment points to the unpredictability of the future and an expressed rage or violence 
that does not project a future tethered to an externality. Various actors, from those who 
had previously opposed external power such as the sovereign institution or state 
                                                
65 Edward Said argues in “Identity, Negation, Violence” that the mobilization of various people beyond 
national borders terrorized by nation-states has the adverse effect of accentuating an adherence to 
national identity. This in turn makes Israel more defensive and violent toward Palestine. He writes: 
“[W]hat to Palestians has been revealed by the intifadah is the true political mass basis for all national 
liberation movements, in which neither the uninstructed gun alone nor the random (if understandable) 
outrage, has anything like the moral and mobilizable force of coordinated, intelligent, courageous 
human action. When one of the uprising’s leaders in Gaza was asked by a journalist how unarmed 
children, men and women defied Israeli troops so routinely, the answer testified elegantly, to how a 
popular movement had in fact banished terror. ‘Fear,’ he said, ‘has been forbidden.’ And that was that.” 
Here, “[f]ear” points to a perception that preempts what will happen in the next moment after a present 
action, and the kind of influence that comes in its aftermath. The Israeli military anticipates the future 
and terrorizes Palestine. The occupier takes away the undecidability of the colonized from the present to 
the future, which enables the occupier to be ready to exercise violence in the present toward future. That 
“[f]ear” “has been forbidden” does not mean that they are not afraid of military conflict with the Israeli 
army. It means resisting the undecidability of the future that is continually being taken away by the 
occupier. Edward W. Said “Identity, Negation and Violence” in The Politics of Dispossession The 
Struggle for Palestinian Self-Determination 1969-1994, (New York: Pantheon Books, 1994), 349. 
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suddenly, or those who had previously negotiated with it, now hold a new power to 
open up the future. Such a moment give us a glimpse of an undecidedable future. For 
this, let us turn to the next section. 
2. Constituent Power 
     The post 9/11 is an era when discussions on power/violence of the minority 
subject situated in an overwhelmingly inferior position to power is easily linked with 
terrorism. In this new era, how can we reestablish discussions on power/violence? 
Needless to say, thinking around this problem and the social world itself completely 
changed after the terrorist attacks of September 2011. A rash of military operations 
executed in Afghanistan and Iraq, and frequent terrorist attacks occurred globally 
thereafter. This era accentuates a certain taboo even within academia that cowers from 
the idea of directly addressing the problem of power/violence. 
 However, even though the importance of creating critical thought and theory 
regarding power/violence after 9/11 has become undeniable, self-censorship has 
largely led to its deterioration. It is also certain that the inhabitation of such thought 
was not only brought on by the social situation after 9/11, but also by practical ways of 
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thinking far removed from philosophy such as the commonplace practice of 
expressing the pros and cons of violence and terrorism.  
 It is well known that the distinction between peacetime and wartime, which 
has never existed from the beginning, is merely a fabrication. This has not only been 
argued by anti-war activists, but also openly acknowledged by military authorities and 
policymakers who execute military operations on the so-called “war on terrorism.” 
Global surveillance programs, covert military operations, psychological warfare, 
assassinations, abductions etc… Through new developments in the military, 
intelligence organizations and special forces play a pivotal role which is clearly 
different from conventional warfare. This all goes to suggest that our so-called peace 
time living space mentioned above has become increasingly subject to militarization.66 
This is another manifestation of the landscape of the world after the demise of civil 
society. Forms of political protest channeled through the institutions of civil society 
involve in some form or another the legitimation of violence. With the withering away 
                                                
66 Refer to the following work regarding new military developments within the United States. Chalmers 
A. Johnson The Sorrows of Empire: Militarism, Secrecy, and the End of the Republic, (New York: 
Metropolitan Books, 2004). 
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of civil society, however, the structures that legitimated violent political protest have 
equally withered away, so that now it appears that no oppositional violence can be 
legitimated. As Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri have argued, the possibility of 
protest has been reduced to a binary of nonviolent action on one side, and terrorism on 
the other. There seems to be nowhere left to stand between these two unacceptable 
positions.67 
     On the one hand, we have been witness to desperate armed struggles carried out 
during the so-called peacetime of our everyday living space in recent years. On the 
other hand, we have also been witness to a valorization of political practice that 
thoroughly rejects the existence of violence itself from individuals such as Mahatma 
Gandhi and Martin Luther King Jr. Given these conditions, where can we locate the 
possibility for social practice and social movements?68 
                                                
67 Hardt and Negri Labor of Dionysus: A Critique of State-Form (Minneapolis: University of 
Minnesota Press, 1994, 2000), 293. 
68 At the same time, I would like to reserve critical space between my own rendering of non-violence 
and the rather rigid stereotyping of non-violence by Negri and Hardt. In particular, what needs to be 
reconsidered is their assertion that non-violence is indicative of the fact that people are powerless. In 
other words, they are too quick to equate non-violence with a negation of power. By contrast, Sakai 
Takashi has argued that in certain moments the restraint of violence does not immediately entail the 
negation of antagonism. Sakai discusses this point through the example of Martin Luther King Jr.’s non-
violent direct action (NVDA). Ever since the Montgomery bus boycott in which King’s NVDA worked 
toward the struggle for anti-discrimination of blacks in the South, “refraining from violence intensified 
antagonism.” King considered NVDA a means to reveal a residually hidden antagonism or constitute 
antagonism. In this way, King’s tactics that made fire where there is no smoke is not a passive and 
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Negri and Hardt both distance themselves from terrorism and non-violence 
in their discussion on the possibility of political practice today. On the one hand, they 
recognize terrorism as having a “suicidal and counterproductive character.”69 On the 
other hand, they point out that “[t]he rejection of violence on which it is based is too 
easily confused with a rejection of power tout court.”70 In particular, the discourse of 
non-violence emphasizes and appeals to “the unjust plight of the powerless,”71 which 
is widely seen in the current anti-war movement. Negri and Hardt point out that such 
discourse leads to denying power and behaving thoroughly “powerless”72 through the 
mass media, or in other words, it forces them into having to play the role of the victim. 
                                                
powerless mode of action, but rather combative to the extent that they smoked out the reality of the 
antagonistic relation without neutralizing it. Conversely, non-violent discourse which blocks or 
neutralizes effects that bring antagonism to light, falls into naïve moralistic theory. Hence, it is 
necessary to discuss NVDA based on concrete situations. It is rash to conclude that NVDA simply 
entails the negation of power.  
     Nonetheless, even if we allow for this affirmative reading of NVDA, there remains a matter to be 
considered. While NVDA may succeed in smoking out antagonism, to the extent that NVDA is 
premised on beliefs or notions of justice, there is always the danger of evoking factions categorized 
according to the political will of individuals who support or oppose the beliefs or justice called into 
play. When the mechanism of the expression of a political will or factionalism is brought to politics, can 
social practice constituted here really be called the multitude? If this practice does not allow for a part 
that does not become a whole, then it merely entails a part of the whole which forecloses specific 
groups of people from the beginning. Such are the all-to-easy-to-understand political maps that divide 
people along conservative and liberal lines. Such factionalism establishes intent behind human acts as 
the purported cause of action, simplifies power relations, and then takes on the function of dividing 
social power. This chapter considers emotions such as rage that does not depend on any externality and 
functions in a different register from belief or justice implicit in organized activism.  
Takashi Sakai, Bōryoku no Tetsugaku, (Tokyo: Kawadeshōshisha, 2004), 41, 44. 
69 Hardt and Negri Labor of Dionysus, 291. 
70 Ibid., 291. 
71 Ibid., 291. 
72 Ibid., 291. 
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They insist that such behavior soon becomes necessary to maintain an “attitude of 
purity from violence.”73 Since it denies all possible violence, it falls into a discussion 
centered on morality or asceticism “by posing oneself as completely outside of it.”74  
As a result, such moral discourse obfuscates how violence is intricately 
inscribed into everyday life and detracts from the ability to think critically about it. 
Although it is true that violence implies the physically injury or death of the 
individual, this definition is insufficient. Could it be, as we will soon see, what the law 
fears the most is the carnivalesque taking up of violence by the people themselves 
whereas it is usually only privy to the state? When the people come to take up 
violence in this way, what they suggest is that to the degree that violence is a part of 
everyday life, it is not appropriate to deny its actual existence. 
 Hence, Negri and Hardt neither avoid praising or negating violence, but 
rather attempt to reestablish a political practice, that is to say, what they call 
“constituent power” in a place that is “barren between the two poles.”75 
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Of course, it is Walter Benjamin’s “Critique of Violence” that Negri and 
Hardt depart from when considering the possibility of this political practice. When 
Benjamin critiques the relation between the law and violence, he stipulates two kinds 
of state violence: law-preserving violence and lawmaking violence.76 The state 
attempts to maintain an established a legal order through legally recognized means and 
deploys physical violence when it fails to maintain the legal order. What is important 
here is the fact that the state tries to enforce the law and recover the legal order after 
the state suppresses something like a riot where the people exercise violence for 
themselves. Hence, there is a trace of violence which is unavoidably inscribed in the 
origin of the law that restores the new order of peace. 
     At the same time, if the violence that antagonizes state violence is pulled back 
into the newly recognized legal order after the confrontation, it becomes violence that 
possess a lawmaking character as well. In this way, Benjamin terms both lawmaking 
                                                
76 Walter Benjamin, “Critique of Violence,” in Benjamin Reflection, Trans. Edmund Jephcott, (New 
York: Schocken Books, 1978),  
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violence and law-preservating violence “mythic violence.” “Divine violence,” by 
contrast, is violence which is incapable of being recuperated by the legal order. 
 As Negri and Hardt argue, if the former form of violence “involves 
constructing an external relation between an action (violence) and its representation 
(the law),”77 then the “second form of violence, revolutionary violence, is “unalloyed” 
or “immediate” in the sense that it does not look to anything external to itself, to any 
representation, for its effects.”78 What begs emphasis here is how mythic violence 
attempts to establish an externalized legal order or norms and then explain itself in 
terms of this externality. On the other hand, divine violence does not seek any 
externality through which to explain itself, and therefore “expresses life in itself in a 
nonmediate way, outside of law, in the form of the living.”79 The second practice is 
exactly another name for what they call “constituent power.”   
3. Internality in the Work of Frantz Fanon 
                                                
77 Hardt and Negri Labor of Dionysus, 294. 
78 Ibid., 294. 
79 Ibid., 294. 
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     Frantz Fanon is useful here in order to consider a radical form of life that 
expresses itself without externality. Fanon, who was critical about the cultural politics 
of negritude, located the possibility of opening up a new sociality through negritude as 
force that is the end in itself. For instance, Jean-Paul Sartre argues in “Black Orpheus” 
that “it is the dialectical law of successive transformations which leads the Negro to 
coincidence with himself in negritude. It is not a matter of his knowing, or of his 
ecstatically tearing himself away from himself, but rather of both discovering and 
becoming what he is.”80 He continues that this is the “Negritude-object.”81 The 
problem is that Sartre has already determined the fate of an internal force that is 
engaged in “becoming what he is,” or in other words, negritude is already embedded 
in a history that unfolds dialectically. Sartre writes:  
In fact, negritude appears like the upbeat {unaccented beat} of 
a dialectical progression; the theoretical and practical 
affirmation of white supremacy is the thesis; the position of 
                                                
80 Jean-Paul Sartre “Black Orpheus,” in “What is Literature?” and Other Essays (Cambridge, 
Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1988), 307. 
81 Ibid., 313. 
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negritude as an antithetical value is the moment of negativity. 
But this negative moment is not sufficient in itself, and these 
black men who use it know this perfectly well; they know that 
it aims at preparing the synthesis or realization of the human 
being in a raceless society. Thus, negritude is for destroying 
itself; it is a “crossing to” and not an “arrival at,” a means and 
not and end.82 
For Sartre, negritude as “the moment of negativity” in opposition to white 
supremacy has to be sublated by revolution in the end. In other words, Sartre says 
negritude has to disappear when a “raceless society” arrives in the future. In this way, 
negritude becomes a temporal “crossing to” revolution, or a “means” through which 
revolution is achieved. 
     In response to this, Fanon cannot hide his frustration toward Sartre’s reference 
to dialectical history saying that “Jean-Paul Satre, in this work, has destroyed black 
                                                
82 Ibid., 327 
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zeal.”83 He continues, “In opposition to historical becoming, there had always been 
the unforeseeable. I needed to lose myself completely in negritude.”84 In other words, 
Sartre preempts an internally moving force, (i.e., “becoming what he is”) and then 
contains the antagonism or un-foreseeability that force creates by introducing a post-
revolutionary historical stage which he describes as the “realization of the human 
being in a raceless society.” What frustrates Fanon is that Sartre robs the movement of 
its internality which is the very thing that enables Fanon to identify himself with the 
object and “lose” himself in it. Fanon writes: 
     The dialectic that brings necessity into the 
foundation of my freedom drives me out of myself. It 
shatters my unreflected position. Still in terms of 
consciousness, black consciousness is immanent in its own 
eyes. I am not a potentiality of something, I am wholly 
what I am. I do not have to look for the universal. No 
                                                
83 Frantz Fanon, Black Skin, White Mask, Trans. Charles Lam Markmann (New York: Grove Press, 
1967), 135. 
84 Ibid., 135. 
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probability has any place inside me. My Negro 
consciousness does not hold itself out as a lack. It is. It is 
its own follower.85 
Here Fanon very explicitly describes internality as something that is “immanent in its 
own eyes” and does not look toward any externality for recognition. As Negri and 
Hardt state, “this negative moment, this violent reciprocity, does not lead to any 
dialectical synthesis; it is not the upbeat that will be resolved in a future harmony.”86 
Fanon, who contends that “[i]n opposition to historical becoming, there had always 
been the unforeseeable,” insists that antagonistic Negro consciousness is not fated for 
sublation at the stage of revolution nor is it fated to disappear. He emphases that “[i]t 
is.” For Fanon, this mode of life as “[it] is” is not a temporal lack or negativity, but 
exactly something that takes place with “a positive logic.”87  
     Fanon continues to develop the necessity of a force without externality in 
“Algeria Unveiled” published in A Dying Colonialism. Since the 1930s, the French 
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colonial government launched anti-veil campaigns in the name of liberating Algerian 
women from this traditional “evil practice” in Algeria. The colonizer attempted to 
rescue Algerian women who were “humiliated, sequestered, cloistered”88 by Algerian 
men, and then urged them to take veil off and revolt against native traditional values. 
Such colonial policy is rooted in the European desire to possess something hiding 
behind the veil: as Fanon writes, “a romantic exoticism, strongly tinged with 
sensuality.”89 From the eyes of the European, the veil appears to conceal the beauty 
behind it, and as such, evokes an unrequited desire. Hence, the veil emerges as an 
object of conquest. Each unveiling of an Algerian woman purportedly points to the 
Europe success of colonial domination. However, for Algerian women, the veil was a 
part of traditional form of dress that had they never been conscious of as such in their 
daily lives; it becomes fetishized during the colonial war. In this context, wearing the 
veil emerged as a symbol of resistance against colonialism. The veil, hence, was 
fraught with multiple meanings. 
                                                
88 Frantz Fanon, “Algeria Unveiled” in A Dying Colonialism, Trans. Haakon Chevalier (New York: 
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     Fanon focuses in on the way in which Algerian women carrying out missions 
for the Front de Libération Nationale (FLN) flexibly react toward the interpretational 
politics of the veil and the particular form of struggle in which they transform their 
bodies during battle. Each time Algerian women take off the veil, the colonizer 
rejoices in the assumption that Algerian women have disposed of their traditional 
values. However, the Algerian women of FLN took advantage of this European 
assumption and used it against them. 
 Algerian women performed an identification with Europeans by taking off 
the veil, applying makeup, changing up their hairstyle, wearing skirts, and carrying 
handbags.90 At a checkpoint located between Arab residential areas and the European 
city, French military police set up checkpoints on strict alert whereupon they 
thoroughly inspected Arab belongings. However, when an Algerian woman donning 
European attire shows up, the military police let their guard down and let her through. 
Although she smiles at the military police officer, who is foppish and teases her, she 
                                                
90 There must have been many Algerian women who abandoned Algerian traditional values, and 
identified themselves with European by wearing European clothes. However, as Diana Fuss states, 
“[f]or Fanon, it is politically imperative to insist upon an instrumental difference between imitation and 
identification, because it is precisely politics that emerges in the dislocated space between them.” Diana 
Fuss, Identification Papers, (New York and London: Routledge, 1995), 153.  
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passes through the checkpoint without a trace of awkwardness. It never occurs to the 
military police that there may in fact be concealed pistols, bombs, or documents in her 
handbag.91    
     Reading this act, Fanon argues that Algerian women had to struggle against not 
only the colonizer, but also their own bodies. The veil, which shuts their bodies off 
from the outside world, allows for a solitary peaceful space. More than just traditional 
clothing for Algerian women, it allows for this kind of corporal dimension in relation 
to space. He suggests that the veil is an extension of their bodies that mediates the 
movement or comportment of the body vis-à-vis the outside world. Stripping of the 
veil is tantamount to the loss of comportment. The women momentarily become 
disoriented and are at a loss about how to maintain a sense of balance with the outside 
world. He writes, “Without the veil she has an impression of her body being cut up 
into bits, put adrift; the limbs seem to lengthen indefinitely.”92 “She has an impression 
of being improperly dressed even of being naked.”93 “She experiences a sense of 
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incompleteness with great intensity.”94 “She has the anxious feeling that something is 
unfinished, and along with this a frightful sensation of disintegrating.”95 Fanon is 
attentive to the transformation of their sense of comportment through the process that 
they assume their revolutionary mission. He continues: 
     The absence of the veil distorts the Algerian woman’s 
corporal pattern. She quickly has to invent new dimension for her 
body, new means of muscular control. She has to create for 
herself an attitude of unveiled-woman-outside. She must 
overcome all timidity, all awkwardness (for she must pass for a 
European), and at the same time be careful not to overdo it, not to 
attract notice to herself. The Algerian woman who walks stark 
naked into the European city relearns her body, re-establish it in a 
totally revolutionary fashion. This new dialectic of the body and 
of the world is primary in the case of one revolutionary woman.96 
                                                
94 Ibid., 59 
95 Ibid., 59. 
96 Ibid., 59. 
   92 
The most important point here is that Fanon elucidates their execution of the mission 
not through special training, but through the ability to “create for herself” as a woman 
who “learns both her role as ‘a woman alone in the street’ and her revolutionary 
mission instinctively.97” He continues: 
     In the face of the extraordinary success of this new 
form of popular combat, observers have compared the 
action of the Algerian women to that of certain women 
resistance fighters or even secret agents of the specialized 
services. It must be constantly borne in mind that the 
committed Algerian woman learns both her role as “a 
woman alone in the street” and her revolutionary mission 
instinctively. The Algerian woman is not a secret agent. 
It is without apprenticeship, without briefing, without 
fuss, that she goes out into the street with three grenades 
in her handbag or the activity report of an area in her 
                                                
97 Ibid., 50. 
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bodice. She does not have the sensation of playing a role 
she has read about ever so many times in novels, seen in 
motion pictures. There is not that coefficient of play, of 
imitation, almost always present in this form of action 
when we are dealing with a Western woman.98 
Fanon here writes of Algerian women who pretend to be Algerian women who 
identify with European women: mimicry. Yet, their behavior is not imitation in the 
sense that it is not a “coefficient of play.” A performer is usually given time to 
physically imitate the motion of an original model (i.e., rehearsal) before a 
performance in order to repeat what they learned. But since Algerian women engaged 
in revolutionary practice do not have a script, or what Fanon refers to “[t]he doctrine 
of the Revolution,” “the strategy of combat,” or “forms of behavior,” they lack an 
external model they can refer to before acting. Hence, they are not “secret agents of 
the specialized services” who are trained beforehand. Like Spinoza who wrote of the 
simultaneity of conceiving and producing, what is important is that they must 
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immediately imitate without a script at an un-repeatable time and place. There is no 
repetition or redoing. Their every corporeal motion is predicated on an unpredictable 
force. Therefore, “[w]hat we have here is not the bringing to light of a character 
known and frequented a thousand times in imagination or in stories. It is an authentic 
birth in a pure state without preliminary instruction.”99 Fanon called such new social 
power, which emerges during the struggle, “new attitudes, new mode of action, new 
ways.”100 This new mode of being, akin to conatus, is exactly the same as a mode of 
life he calls “[i]t is.” 
     With Fanon’s assertion of a mode of action that does not will for an end, but 
simply “is,” let us turn to two works from Medoruma’s repertoire that focus explicitly 
on violence: “Hope” and Rainbow Bird in the next two chapters. 
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Chapter 4 
Medoruma’s “Hope” 
First published in the Asahi Shimbun in 1999, Medoruma Shun’s short essay 
“Hope” evoked a mixed response from its readers due to a series of violent scenes 
depicted in the story. For example, the non-violent activist Mukai Kō points out that 
although “Hope” brings to light the irresponsibleness of the Japanese people who have 
been nothing but mere “onlookers” to the issue of US military bases in Okinawa, he 
nevertheless does not hesitate to voice his distaste for the story because “terrorism” is 
committed against a child. He remarks, “I don’t want to be forgiving of the author’s 
imagination that crosses that line.101” 
 “Hope” is about an Okinawan who abducts and kills the child of a US 
soldier. As such, many have interpreted this as an act of terrorism. In the background 
of this story is the well-known, real rape of a schoolgirl by three US soldiers in 1995. 
Thereafter, all eyes became fixed on Okinawa, wherein normative representations of 
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Okinawans and anti-war movements circulated throughout the media both nationally 
and internationally. The cruel image of the Okinawan protagonist in the story, 
however, is incompatible with these established representations and instead subverts 
the norms attached to them. Medoruma writes:  
A meek ethnic group that at best ducks issues by 
holding rallies and polite demonstrations as they talk 
about anti-war or anti-base or anti-whatever…There 
are the leftists or extremists, but the best they can do 
is ineffectual guerrilla activities…Neither would they 
conduct an act of terror or kidnap someone important, 
nor would they ever take up arms… A comforting 
island that loves peace.102  
Here the protagonist outright mocks the stereotype of the peace-loving Okinawan anti-
military activist. 
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 Representations and their accompanying norms created under the colonial 
condition cannot be reduced to any facile discussion on images. Instead of ending with 
a description of how the images appear, Fanon locates rifts in the colonizer’s smooth 
representations that challenge the colonial order. As he asserts, representations created 
in the colony such as “(t)he Algerians, the veiled women, the palm trees and the 
camels,” “make up the landscape, the natural background to the human presence of the 
French.”103 In short, objectifying and representing the colony or the colonized as if 
they were part of the natural landscape is tantamount to facilitating the constitution of 
the French as a colonizing subject, who panoramically views the landscape. Through 
this process, the colonial world is constructed. But as Frantz Fanon clarified, 
representations of the colonial world are always fraught with a hostility that resists 
representation. Fanon does not attribute the “natural background” merely to nature, but 
also to a “(h)ostile nature” or an “obstinate and fundamentally rebellious [nature].” 
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     Hostile nature, obstinate and fundamentally rebellious, is in fact represented in 
the colonies by the bush, mosquitoes, natives, and fever; colonization is a success 
when all this wild nature has finally been tamed.104 The colonizer calls the force, 
which rebels against him/her, and which he/she regards as uncontrollable, “hostile 
nature.” This is why the hostilities must be hidden, neutralized, and dissolved into a 
pacified and unresisting natural landscape such as “(t)he Algerians,” “the veiled 
women,” “the palm trees,” or “the camels.” Fanon detects a threatening force labeled 
as hostility in this objectified natural landscape that could potentially dismantle the 
colonial order.  
  It is precisely Fanon’s treatment of hostility as a force denied by the 
colonizer that emerges in the provocative speech of “Hope”’s protagonist who resists 
stereotypes and the norms that go along with them. In this way, it was scandalous and 
                                                
104 Ibid., 182. Edward Said makes similar observations about representation and antagonism in 
Orientalism. “The point is that what remained current about Islam was some necessarily diminished 
version of those great dangerous forces that it symbolized for Europe. Like Walter Scott’s Saracens, the 
European representation of the Muslim, Ottoman, or Arab was always a way of controlling the 
redoubtable Orient, and to a certain extent the same is true of the methods of contemporary learned 
Orientalists, whose subject is not so much the East itself as the East made known, and therefore less 
fearsome, to the Western reading public.” In other words, the “redoubtable Orient” has to be represented 
as the form in which its antagonism is neutralized. Edward W. Said, Orientalism, (New York: Vintage 
Books, 1978), 60. 
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outrageous that an Okinawan, who was supposed to only know how to “love peace” 
and participate in “polite demonstrations,” betrayed the norms and rebelled with the 
cruelty of killing a small child.105 People were taken aback by the incident, thrown 
into a panic, and utterly bewildered. Here, they attempted to make some sense out of 
the incident: “Yeah, I can’t even turn a decent profit these days….”  “What will 
happen if we lose even more tourists?”  “Hurry up and catch [the criminal] already. 
On with the death penalty.”106 
These characters deal with the incident by attempting to contain its 
antagonism. However, the protagonist sneers at the people’s shock, and declares:  
What is necessary for Okinawa now is not a 
demonstration of a few thousands or a rally of a few 
tens of thousands, but the death of one American small 
child…Only the worst means possible are effective.107  
In the end, the terrorist burns itself to death after it murmurs the following. 
                                                
105 Medoruma, Okinawa Kusa no Koe, Ne no Ishi, 288. 
106 Ibid., 288. 
107 Ibid., 289. 
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I didn’t have any regret or deep emotion. Just like the 
fluids of small organisms caught in the grip of anxious 
fear suddenly turns into poison, I thought what I had 
done was natural and necessary for this island. 108 
The protagonist’s last statement has incited much discomfort among its readers 
because it seems to publicly justify terrorism as “natural and necessary.” For example, 
Mukai mentioned earlier simply concludes that “Hope” justifies “terrorism” in the 
name of resistance. He defines terrorism as a suicidal act committed by “those under 
extreme conditions” who, “out of despair,” are incapable of “turning to any other 
measure.” His reading suggests that the protagonist murdered the young child as a 
last-resort act passively committed by an individual who was completely cornered. In 
addition, he argues that terrorism differs from a riot in that the former is carried out by 
the resolution of a single individual and aims to “provoke and reveal the violent nature 
of the state.” In other words, he suggests that the protagonist both recognized and 
invoked state power which is bereft of any sort of sociality, thereby leaving violence 
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to be taken up as an individual issue. It is with this definition of terrorism that he reads 
Medoruma’s “Hope.” He interprets the words “natural and necessary” with the 
assumption that the protagonist has already accepted the antagonistic relationship 
between the ruler and ruled as set in stone. That is to say, he regards the “natural and 
necessary” as a cliché that glorifies the hostility of those die-hard revolutionists who 
are ready to engage in a dialectic struggle with the ruler at the risk of their lives. In 
perpetuating such an antagonistic relationship, the teleological outcome of struggle is 
of utmost importance: will we celebrate victory or lament defeat? 
 However, Mukai’s rendering of the protagonist’s conduct, which he calls 
“terrorism,” in the passive sense of something turned to out of “despair” in the absence 
of any other possible means, is highly problematical. In place of such approach, this 
chapter seeks a different reading of the “natural and necessary” as a force that takes 
itself as an aim. Hence, it is necessary to develop a line of thought that differs from the 
discourse of counterviolence. In other words, the “natural and necessary” actions 
described in the story do not entail a justification for counterviolence. As this chapter 
will soon show, the “natural and necessary” rather indicate a positive force that takes 
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itself as an aim; it is not an act where one calculates an effect or reaction the act will 
have on the oppressor beforehand within a master/slave dialectic. Although it may 
certainly implicate exteriority to the extent that the action produces effects or 
reactions, it nonetheless it produces a surplus that is not predicated on this exteriority. 
That is, it produces a mode of life that takes itself as an aim. What “Hope” makes clear 
is the denial of a life regulated by an economy of power between the oppressor and the 
oppressed, and the denial of the dichotomy itself. 
 Furthermore, in his juxtaposition of nonviolent direct action among those 
engaged in “the ordinary way of life, or a way of living that already exists as our 
everyday lives” with the activism or terrorism of organized experts, Mukai places 
more importance on the former. However, he completely fails to understand that this 
“ordinary way of life, or way of living” is almost synonymous with Medoruma’s 
“natural and necessary” which he associates with “terrorism.”109  
                                                
109 Such ordinary life has a relationship to Kiyota Masanobu’s description of his father, who frantically 
moved around to look for food for his family on the Okinawan battlefield in order to survive. Kiyota 
describes the scene as follows: “When all the villagers were taking shelter in a mountain, my father was 
digging up yams beside the marching US military. He went back and forth between our house and the 
mountain to carry food saying that ‘I don't understand what this refuge is for if my children starve to 
death before they die of gunshots.’ Although he was not acting according to any special philosophy, he 
still had the original philosophy of an ordinary person invested in the survival of his family. He was 
imbued with confidence in a sense of the everyday that does not dissolve into custom (fūbutsu).” While 
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 This is why the protagonist’s act does not reverse the power relation 
between the master and slave, nor is it concerned about the outcome of the 
confrontation. In fact, the telos of struggle as victory or defeat bears no meaning on 
the suicidal death that ends the story. Moreover, there is a point that Mukai 
intentionally avoid referring to. What the story narrates is not despair but rather 
“hope” as indicated by the title. Doubtlessly, the counterviolence this story describes 
is literally cruel and frightening. However, as described above, there is something that 
goes beyond this counterviolence.  
 And finally, the most important point of this story: the relationship between 
the protagonist’s sexuality and violence. Although the story unfolds through the 
protagonist’s actions and words in mostly first person narration, it does not reveal “its” 
gender. Nevertheless, since most readers regard the protagonist as male, nobody has 
paid enough attention to “its” sexuality. Regardless of whether readers are critical or 
                                                
many civilians were cornered by the Japanese or American military and committed group suicide 
(shūdan jiketsu) in many areas throughout Okinawa, Kiyota’s father actions make a clear contrast to the 
everydayness that was regulated by Japanese imperialism. In other words, Kiyota’s father tried to 
protect the sense of the everyday that stems from his own life and not from the temporality of imperial 
Japanese history. For him, the imperative for everyday life is what drove him to save his family to 
survive from starvation, and is hence precisely what is “natural and necessary.” Kiyota Masanobu, 
‘Seikatsu Ishiki to Jōshōʼ in Jōnen no Rikigaku Okinawa no Shi Jōkyō Kaiga, (Naha: Shinseiboshi 
Shuppan, 1980), 340.  
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not of the Oedipus complex, there is a tacit understanding that the subject who exerts 
violence is always a male. Since there is no pronoun or grammatical indication of the 
protagonist’s gender, it is impossible to simply assume “Hope” is a story that recovers 
the masculinity of the colonized male who negates castration.110 Conversely, such 
norms regarding violence have be a target of criticism. At the same time, it disrupts 
naturalizing norms associated with victimhood, which appears in categories such as 
the “innocent child.” It is The Rainbow Bird that more clearly and critically 
problematizes the politics of these norms that are circulated and naturalized in society. 
For this we will turn to the next chapter. 
  
                                                
110 Jeong Yujin makes a similar point. Jeong Yujin, ““Anpo no Mondai wo Onna no Mondai toshite 
Waishōa Suruna’ toiu Shuchō wo Meguru Aru Seiji: Kanjō Mondai wo Meguru Seiji no Kattō, Aruiwa 
Kattō toiu Seiji,” in Gendai Okinawa no Rekishi Keiken Kibō, Aruiwa Miketsusei ni tsuite, Ed. 
Tomiyama Ichirō and Mori Yoshio, (Tokyo: Seikyu Sha, 2010) 392-393. 
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Chapter 5 
Medoruma’s Rainbow Bird 
1. The Force of Attraction 
   Although many assume that the protagonist of “Hope” who murders and 
American child is male, an examination of other stories by Medoruma such as the 
Rainbow Bird reveals Medoruma’s is no stranger to complicating gendered norms 
about violence. Gender functions to deliver a scathing critique of norms that govern 
social movements in Okinawa and open up a different possibility for violence as a 
life force that can animate subjects excluded by social norms.    
     This chapter engaged with Judith Butler’s work on norms and unfolds as a 
critical plot summary that shows Medoruma’s development of violence as a sheer 
force of life, the harnessing of a life force to overcome hardship, critique of norms 
implicit within social movements, and discovering the possibility of a life that cannot 
be chosen.  
The Rainbow Bird is told through the eyes of twenty-one-year-old male 
protagonist named Katsuya. After repeated beatings and bullying by a group of 
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delinquent upperclassmen led by a youth named Higa, Katsuya came to submit 
himself to Higa. By doing so, Katsuya reasoned that he can avoid exposing his life to 
danger, and even reveled in the illusion that he was being protected by him. Higa was 
such that if anyone even showed a hint of insubordination in his presence, he would 
beat them with abandon to show off his brutality and plant the seeds of terror within 
their hearts. He sought to make it perfectly clear that there was no other tyrant 
besides himself and that it was he who possessed a monopoly on violence. 
 This is why Katsuya was frightened of Higa as a monopolist of violence, 
“felt something different in him from other upperclassmen, and came to be drawn to 
him.”111 Katsuya was drawn to his awesome power that kept anything at a bay and 
ruled anyone at will. “He even felt a surge of loneliness and anxiety when he was 
abandoned and left behind by Higa.”112 In this way, Katsuya was mired with 
conflicting emotions: the utter fear and complete adoration for a tyrant who ruled with 
an awesome power. The masochistic desire to entrust one’s fate to a tyrant and to be 
                                                
111 Medoruma Shun, Niji no Tori, (Tokyo: Kage Shobō, 2006), 60. 
112 Ibid., 60. 
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recognized and protected by him. The hasty attempt to suppress any harm that may 
come one’s way by seeking the recognition and love of the Other and by becoming at 
one with the Other instead of confronting it head on. Although these emotions seem 
discordant, they coexisted as one in Katsuya. The total fear Higa ingrained in Katsuya 
controlled his every move. Higa’s gaze would never fade from Katsuya’s mind. In 
other words, Katsuya actions were imbued with an acute consciousness of the 
dangerous Other called Higa at all times. The more Katsuya sensed the dangerous 
Other, the more he compelled himself to shed or conceal his internal hostility toward 
it, and the more he sought to become a part of the Other. In this way, the story is 
centered on a structure of ambivalent desire toward violence, recognition from the 
Other, and the longing for love. What is important is not criticizing Higa as a tyrant 
who oppressed Katsuya but in establishing a force of attraction to an awesome power 
that can transform into a life force to overcome hardship (to be discussed in the next 
section).  
     The female protagonist Mayu came from a single-mother home. She was an 
active junior high schoolgirl who became a member of the student body by her second 
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year and was popular among the students due to her attractive looks and good grades. 
However, as soon as the upperclassmen who protected her graduated before she 
entered her third year, the situation abruptly changed. She was summoned by a group 
of delinquent students who frequently squeezed her for money and forced her to 
shoplift. Finally, they brutally gang raped her and stuffed pebbles wrapped up in a 
handkerchief into her vagina. Thereafter, Mayu locked herself up in her room and 
graduated from junior high without ever going back to school again. After some time 
elapsed, she was gradually able to go out and started working part-time work near her 
home. Then, one of the female students who had once brutally abused her started to 
frequent the store she was working. “Although Mayu was on guard at first, she 
gradually came to open her heart and talk with the female student as she kindly 
approached her as if nothing had happened before.”113 For Mayu, this female student 
became “the only person Mayu could talk to,” because at that time she did not get 
along with her mother.114 Katsuya was able to understand “Mayu’s behavior of 
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dependency on the one who hurt her, which looked odd at first glance” because it was 
exactly the same type of relationship Katsuya had with Higa.115 Mayu tried to get 
back into the swing of things and return to the outside world that she had once rejected 
through the recognition and love of a female student who had once abused her. 
 However, her attempt to return to society was once again shattered. The 
female student approached Mayu only to lure her back to the group of delinquent 
students. Mayu was blackmailed by the group with photos of her gang rape that were 
finally sold to Higa who was leading the lower branch of the gang after he graduated 
from junior high school. Then, Mayu was sent to Katsuya, who just as before was still 
caught in Higa’s grip. Katsuya’s task given by Higa was to lure men through a two-
shot dial service, take photos of them prostituting women Higa sent Katsuya’s way, 
and then hand the photos to Higa. Higa used the incriminating photos to blackmail and 
extort large sums of cash from the men. The women who Higa sent to Katsuya never 
tried to escape because they were enfeebled by an addiction to drugs. However, Mayu 
was already weaker than any of the other women when she was sent to Katsuya. No 
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matter what he said to her, her expression never changed, and she appeared as if she 
lost any interest in the outside world. 
 Although both Katsuya and Mayu sought the recognition and love of the 
Other who overwhelmed them with incredible violence in the beginning of the story, 
both of them stopped seeking recognition as the story develops. Rather, they came to 
destroy the existing relation with the Other. As a result, the story also focuses on 
force, which harbors the possibility of changing the relationship with the Other. 
2. A Life Force that Struggles with Hardship 
 Other characters who appear in the story are Katsuya’s parents, older sister, 
and two older brothers. These characters are all portrayed in terms of how they 
struggle with hardship.  
 Katsuya’s mother, Hisayo, fastidiously manages her own café and bar. Since 
she could not find a good job after she graduated from high school in Naha, she started 
working at bar in Koza when the “special procurement” boom was sweeping Okinawa 
at the height of the Vietnam War. This is where she met Katsuya’s father, Munenobu. 
At first, she regarded him with contempt since she thought Munenobu, who is the 
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older brother of a military land lessor (gunyōchi jinushi), was playing with his parents’ 
money. Her perception of Munenobu changed, however, when she found out that as a 
twenty-year-old, he managed a real estate business and worked hard for his money by 
himself. Hisayo started to respond to Munenobu invitation and courtship because of 
this newfound respect for him. Overcome with Munenobu’s enthusiasm, it was not 
long before she became his wife. 
 Although Hisayo quit her job after the marriage and became consumed with 
housework and child care, Munenobu did not quit chasing after women. When he had 
a child out of wedlock, their disagreement did not stop at a heated exchange of words. 
While they did not directly harm each other physically, they destroyed furniture and 
ruined their house. As an extremely independent woman, Hisayo could not bear 
handing over the military land rents to Munenobu’s lover after the divorce. At the 
same time, she was frustrated with her current situation in which she was reliant on 
and fed by Munenobu. Since Hisayo had long-held ambitions of opening her own bar, 
she had Munenobu fund her venture in exchange for silence with his affair. She 
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worked diligently to launch her business and intended to return the start-up money to 
Munenobu when she could. 
 It was during this time that Katsuya was beaten up by Higa’s group in junior 
high school and was made to join the group. Out of consideration for his mother, 
Katsuya could not tell her about his torment because he was aware of her dreams of 
opening her own bar for some time. Although Katsuya wished she took notice of what 
happened to him below the surface of everyday life, her desperation to escape a 
troublesome family life and devotion to her business ultimately prevented her from 
doing so. After Hisayo’s bar set afoot, she opened a twenty-four-hour game café at a 
different location. She watched over the café at noon and the bar at night. “Everybody 
was at a loss for words because everybody didn’t know when she slept.”116 
     Hisayo is portrayed as a strong-minded female who struggles with the 
difficulties of life but yet manages to go beyond it in the attempt of opening up her 
own future. What Medoruma is concerned with here is establishing a motif for the 
entire story that captures the force of a human who confronts the conditions of an 
                                                
116 Ibid., 92. 
   113 
unfree life. It is about a difficult life that she does not choose, but is thrust upon her 
beyond her control. It is about a force that struggles with hardship under 
overwhelmingly disadvantageous conditions of power. 
 This also pertains to Katsuya’s older sister Hitomi. She is presented as a 
contrast to Katsuya’s older brothers, Munetada and Muneaki. The bothers failed to 
work after graduating from high school. Even though they manage their father’s 
apartment building, they remain mostly idle. The money that they receive for 
managing the apartment is quickly squandered on slot machines from opening to 
closing hour everyday.  
 Like Hisayo, Hitomi is also portrayed as a strong-minded female who 
stubbornly refuses to receive money from her grandparents and becomes irritated with 
her spoiled brothers. Hitomi went to college in Kyushu after she graduated from high 
school. Aside from the matriculation fee, she paid for her own education with financial 
aid and a part-time job. Even if Hisayo and Munenobu sent her money, she was so 
resolute in her independence that she promptly sent it back. Even after she earned her 
teaching credentials and returned to Okinawa, she continued to live independently. 
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She did not hold an extravagant wedding ceremony when she got married with her 
husband. Instead, she made do with a simple reception with her immediate family. 
 Medoruma writes, “Since Katsuya was a child, he had harbored feelings of 
envy and inferiority toward the strong-minded Hitomi who saw through what she once 
decided until to the very end.”117 Hitomi, who took care of Katsuya since he was 
young, repeatedly urged him to not take after his brothers. Katsuya listened to her and 
refused money from his grandparents and parents. Unsurprisingly, she was easily 
frustrated with Munenobu every time he gave money to his two sons. Such an 
environment will ruin you and your brothers. Hitomi told Katsuya he must never take 
after your bothers no matter what happens. These are the words that Hitomi repeated 
to Katsuya since he was a high school student.  
     Even though he asked his mother to lend him money because he did not have 
the funds to pay Higa’s subordinates, Hitomi’s face came to mind. Although he sees 
his father and brothers in a negative light, he is overcome with guilt when he realizes 
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that he is almost the same as them. As such, he reflects that “[w]hen I remembered 
what Hitomi said, guilty feelings and self-hatred surged through my heart.”118 
 He tried to imitate his sister who paid her own way through college and 
started living alone after graduating from high school by supporting himself with a 
part-time job. However, in the end, it did not work. He could on only rely on his 
mother’s money. Although he had survived by currying Higa’s favor since junior high, 
he was not free from Higa’s terrifying grasp even though he loathed his way of life. 
He sighs, “Mayu and I are hammered by a thick nail. I don’t have the power to pull it 
out.”119 The only thing he could do was subordinate himself to Higa and look for ways 
to get by.  
 When Katsuya went to Hisayo’s café after he realized he did not have 
enough money to pay Higa, he unexpectedly ran into Hitomi. Given that all roads 
were congested due to the rally to protest the rape of a twelve-year-old Okinawa girl, 
Katsuya was in the midst of rushing to make it to Higa’s place on time. He almost 
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forcibly asked Hisayo to lend him two-hundred-thousand yen. Even though he was 
conscious of Hitomi’s gaze, he ignored it. 
 When Hitomi saw Katsuya asking Hisayo for money like their two brothers, 
her face sank with a sad expression. She said: “Katsuya, you are the same as your 
bothers in the end. How disgraceful.” “Do you know how difficult it is for an ordinary 
person to earn two-hundred-thousand yen?” “You’re not really working a part-time 
job, are you? How are you gonna return two-hundred-thousand yen?”120 Katsuya 
averted his eyes from Hitomi. He could only say “It’s none of your business!” “Don’t 
lecture me. I need it for an emergency…I’ll give it back within a month.” “You don’t 
know anything about me. Just shut up!”121 
 When Katsuya and Hisayo were about to go to the bank, Hitomi made a 
desperate appeal to Katsuya. “Katsuya, the world (yononaka) will change, you must 
live by yourself, I’m sure you can do it.” The word “change (kawaru)” repeatedly 
echoed through Katsuya’s mind. This word becomes central to the story. Whenever 
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dealt a blow that is like being hammered in by a thick nail, there nonetheless still 
exists another version of his life that confronts, challenges, and struggles with 
difficulties in order to overcome them. In this way, Hitomi could wish for nothing 
more than an effort in which Katsuya struggled no matter what. Since Katsuya 
understood her feelings, he felt out of place and gave in to self-hatred. 
 “Hammered in by a thick nail.” This encapsulates the figure of Katsuya 
depicted by the story. He fears struggling with such a thick nail. In other words, he 
fears changing the relationship he has been forced to establish with Higa and Higa’s 
group since junior high school. This thick nail is another way of expressing the violent 
border between Katsuya and Higa’s gang. As long as the nail is driven into Katsuya, 
that is to say, so long as the border is maintained, the situation remains stable. The 
future is predictable and safe in the present. Even though Katsuya is afraid that the 
relationship between the self and others will change, at the same time, he is filled with 
self-hatred and wants to change his situation. In other words, he has a strong desire for 
a uncertainness of the future in his heart. 
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  This ambivalence is reflected early on when Katsuya was a high school 
student. His social studies teacher talked about the US Special Forces anti-guerilla 
training that took place in northern Okinawa during Vietnam War as a lesson in peace 
education. Katusya’s desire for the uncertainness of the future is expressed in the 
following memory of the teacher’s lesson: 
 Once each of soldiers spread over the mountains, 
they live without any equipment except for an army 
knife for over a month. They learn techniques such as 
hiding in nature, slashing the enemy’s carotid artery, 
and breaking the enemy’s windpipe with their fingers. 
They catch habu snakes or small birds and eat them 
raw. They swallow frogs alive, and identify edible and 
medicinal plants. They endure starvation, perceive the 
enemy with nothing but their own five senses, hide 
themselves in the shade of trees, bushes, and mud, and 
become at one with the forests. They sneak around on 
   119 
dried leaves without making a noise, creep up to the 
opponent from behind, pinion him, and quickly slash 
his carotid artery…For Katsuya, the image of the US 
Special Forces described by his teacher left him with 
the awesome image of those who live to the fullest in 
Okinawa. 
Although the teacher intended to emphasize the cruelty of the military or 
war and allow for an anti-military bases or anti-war sentiment amongst the 
students, Katsuya imagined a soldier who holds his breath, struggles, and 
survives in the deep forest of Yanbaru, and is attracted to the Special 
Forces as “those who live to the fullest in Okinawa.” 
     Kurosawa Ariko reads the Rainbow Bird as “a story of ‘children who kill each 
other,’” and states that “the story that focuses on ‘violence and gender’ is a 
challenging piece that depicts the decay of boys and girls in ‘dangerously circuitous 
community.’” She writes “what dominates the world of ‘the youth/children’ to which 
Katsuya belongs is the clear and simple principle of ‘violence.’” She additionally 
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reads the ‘homosocial bond’ amongst the boys in the same register of an over-
valorization of the ‘soldier,’ or in other words, an incitement of the fantasy of the 
‘military unit’ that fosters their close ties.”122 In other words, she reduces the story to 
a simple principle of violence in which the characters are dominated by relation of 
killing each other. It is this reductive principle of violence that attracts individuals 
such as Katsuya to the Special Forces in the jungle. 
 However, Kurosawa’s views on violence too hastily pass over a litany of 
issues. The story clearly shows the agony of Katsuya’s contradictions symbolized by 
the “thick nail” and the power of life held by Katsuya’s mother and older sister as they 
struggle against hardship. Kurosawa ends with the simple explanation that Katsuya is 
a miserable person who is unfortunately entangled in a circle of violence. She writes:  
It was Higa who was at the top of the ‘food 
chain’ in Katsuya’s sphere of everyday life. 
Inside of that closed circle, children were 
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interdependent on each other and clashed into 
each other mercilessly. In the end, they were 
incapable of seeing the enormous violence 
which makes them kill each other. Resistance 
of the children who lost sight of the enemy led 
to an endless cannibalism. Nobody was 
capable of escaping this closed circle.123 
Kurosawa’s problem is that she ignores Katsuya, Hitomi, and Hisayo’s tenacity in 
surviving hardship, thereby denying it its power. In particular, Katsuya is a passive 
victim of violence and is never seen as a positive agent. According to Kurosawa, 
Katsuya is only allotted the role as a victim who is seized by an enormous violence or 
who is a impotent person resigned to becoming a passive offender. 
 However, to what extent is it possible to read the Yanbaru jungle as an 
enormous cycle of violence as suggested by Kurosawa? Certainly, it points to a 
difficult life which people do not choose for themselves. And certainly, it points to a 
                                                
123 Ibid., 249. 
   122 
dog-eat-dog world among diverse individuals. However, the problem is that she stops 
short of considering the force or will to power of a person who nonetheless attempts to 
survive amidst an overwhelmingly inferior position to power. 
 There is no tool more useful than a knife in the jungle. Hiding in the bushes, 
staving off hunger by eating small animals or wild plants, and dealing with unexpected 
situations by using things provided by nature. It is precisely as Fanon discovered in the 
women in Algeria Unveiled: there is no manual to guide one through an urgent 
situation. Each thought and each use of a tool functions as a sort of bricolage that 
pieces things together in each new circumstance in order to overcome the trials 
inflicted to life by using one’s own body. The individual does not know what will 
happen; the body takes on a defensive posture and is tense from beginning to end. The 
future is radically suspended and undermined. What Katsuya lacked in and wanted 
was this tense body.  
3. Norms 
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 Medoruma had heard of experiences of the Battle of Okinawa from his 
family since he was young.124 Hence, he is an author who presents the problem of 
how to carry on the memory of war as a person who is a descendent of survivors of 
war while also questioning the US military presence in Okinawa. The Rainbow Bird, 
in this way, poses a central problematic: Who can take on the primary role of 
questioning the memory of the Okinawa War and the US military bases? In other 
words, must the experience of the Okinawan War be told and retold through certain 
normative categories? This is what Medoruma problematizes as he focuses on a force 
or being that is elided by the norms of political correctness implicit in the formation of 
contemporary social movements in Okinawa.  
     In Undoing Gender, Judith Butler delineates how what is external to a norm is 
regulated by what is internal to it in the following way: 
The norm governs intelligibility, allows for certain kinds of 
practices and action to become recognizable as such, imposing a 
grid of legibility on the social and defining the parameters of what 
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will and will not appear within the domain of the social. The 
question of what is to be outside the norm is in some sense being 
defined still in relation to it. To be not quite masculine or not quite 
feminine is still to be understood exclusively in terms of one’s 
relationship to the “quite masculine” and the “quite feminine.”125 
Here, evil is paradoxically defined by justice, which is foreclosed by the norm of a 
recognizable social community. When social movements are defined in terms of the 
norms of justice, what kind of relationship can exist between that which is external to 
a norm and anger against military bases? Furthermore, exactly what kind of force does 
anger assume? What unfolds in the Rainbow Bird is a stark contrast between the 
emergence of such a force or being and various social norms within Okinawa. 
 For instance, the man who prostitutes Mayu shockingly turns out to be a 
junior high school teacher. This is revealed in the scene where Katsuya disdainfully 
spits out the question, “Are you a junior high school teacher?”126 In that scene, Mayu, 
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who had ordinarily “looked so bleak as if she lost words themselves,” was suddenly 
animated to brutally beat the naked man with a belt.127 Furthermore, she took him to 
the shower room and poured hot water over him as he begged for mercy. Her violent 
torture did not end there as she cruelly inserted a matchstick up his urethra and lit it. 
Although Katsuya has seen this kind of torture being carried out and has done it 
himself as he was instructed by Higa, “he has never seen a woman doing it.”128 
 One was a teacher, who was socially expected to embody knowledge and 
virtue; it was undoubtedly socially unacceptable that he prostituted a girl whose age 
was almost the same as his own students. The other was a junior high school girl, 
whose grades were as good as her looks, and was such a serious student that she even 
served as a member of the student body. However, in the scene where the male teacher 
prostituted Mayu and Mayu cruelly brutalized him, the norms of “teacher-like” and 
“girl-like” which they are expected to perform by society entirely collapse.  
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On the one hand, the male teacher’s scandalous acts eclipse the image of a 
teacher who is supposed to instruct his student as the embodiment of morality. On the 
other hand, Mayu’s brutal behavior clearly deviates from the integrity of her own 
image as an exemplary student. Both of them caused a blistering backlash from 
society.  
In the story, force begins to raise its head and gushes out as a sort of 
pleasure and ecstasy. The only reason why this sort of force is called “violence” is that 
it clearly deviates from the norms expected of an established society and rebels against 
it. Norms, which embrace prescribed models at each level of the social stratum require 
social recognition of “how one should act,” transform the appropriate structure of 
bodily acts into something predictable in advance, and collapse them into harmonized 
categories. Hence, norms constantly attempt to eliminate from society any 
unpredictable force, or in other words, violence as a disorderly power or desire that is 
antagonistic to society. Norms try to gain their absolute justification and protect 
themselves through the elimination of antagonistic violence. What norms regard as 
enemies is its incapability that it cannot predict the future. 
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Norms such as “teacher-like” and “girlish” have greatly supported the 
ground of anti-base movements in Okinawa. In “Hope,” Medoruma evokes social 
norms associated with an “innocent child” as the protagonist violently strangles him to 
death. This incites an “outrage and hatred toward the crime committed against an 
innocent child.”129 Although this remark was made when characters in “Hope” 
denounced the criminal who killed the small child of a US soldier, the adjective 
“innocent” was also repeatedly used to condemn the US military during the 
demonstrations against the real-life 1995 rape incident when three US soldiers raped a 
twelve-year-old girl. The Rainbow Bird reenacts the demonstration protesting the 1995 
incident, suspends, and then subverts these stereotypical norms. For example, in the 
scene where Katsuya runs into a demonstration of schoolteachers protesting the rape 
incident, it suddenly occurs to him that the teacher who prostituted Mayu might be 
there.  
As soon as he saw the participants holding placards or 
red flags bearing their group name, he noticed that it was 
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a demonstration held by teachers from some elementary, 
junior, and high school. As he watched demonstrators 
marching in a straight row under a pedestrian overpass, 
the face of the man whom Mayu had once brought to the 
room came to mind. He started to look closely at the 
faces of the demonstrators who were filing out of the 
school gate because he thought the man might be there. 
However, he began to feel the absurdity of it all and 
stopped looking.130 
This scene, in which it suddenly came to Katsuya’s mind that the teacher who 
prostituted Mayu might be there, cannot help but give readers a hypocritical 
impression of the teachers’ demonstration that is enabled by the elimination of all 
traces of antagonistic violence implicit in the norms associated with “teacher.” At the 
same time, this scene also tries to show that norms are always accompanied by 
recognition from the state and law, which aims to eliminate antagonistic violence. For 
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example, although demonstrators march forward under strict surveillance by 
plainclothes police officers and the riot police, “some demonstrators were chatting 
away playfully” as if in a nonchalant acceptance of their presence. Medoruma 
continues, “the line, which they never try to cross even when they express their anger, 
is stretched around their mind like the fence around a base.” 131 
 The norms associated with the image of the “pure and innocent girl” that is 
mobilized by the anti-base movement also becomes more chaotic. In the scene where 
Katsuya’s eyes are glued to the live TV broadcast of the prefectural resident rally 
protesting the rape incident, a schoolgirl bravely makes a speech in public expressing 
the hope for peace in Okinawa: 
A girl with long hair was blown up on the TV screen. Her white 
jacket and short reddish-purple necktie made for an 
impressionable uniform; the girl came off as upright and pure, as 
if she were a member of the student body or something. As he 
started to see Mayu’s face whom he saw in the room that 
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afternoon fold over onto the face of the girl speaking her cause to 
the tens of thousands of people in front of a microphone, he was 
dumbstruck. If something, somewhere had been different by even 
a fraction of a moment, the positions of the girl on TV and Mayu 
lying face down on her stomach could have been switched. It 
wasn’t true for just Mayu, but for Katsuya, Higa, or Matsuda as 
well. if only things had been a just a hair different, not only 
Mayu, but even Katsuya, Higa or Matsuda might be in a 
completely different world from now.132  
    “While living in this moment in the same Okinawa, the girl on TV and 
Mayu live in completely opposite worlds. I couldn’t bear this fact.”133 
    The figure of the girl who “came off as upright and pure, as if she were a 
member of the student body or something,” is depicted exactly as Mayu used to be. 
The image of the girl as “upright” and “pure,” which exaggerates political correctness 
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in the movement, is described in a way that contradicts and contrasts Mayu’s life of 
moral decay in which she is forced to prostitute herself and then inflict a most brutal 
torture on her client. When the girl who was raped by US soldiers is associated with 
the “pure” girl who makes the speech and is symbolized as a “victim,” the male-
centered discourse in the movement reinforces the assertion that the powerless, 
innocent, and “pure” girl must be protected by a patriarchal society. 
 The problem here is why must it always be males who execute violence and 
why must it always be females who are subject to it? Yet, this question cannot be 
adequately answered with the simple argument that neither gender should be allowed 
to execute violence. Such a proposition erases the actual problem of how norms 
always foreclose possibilities far before the emergence of a will. As argued at the 
beginning of Section II, irrespective of positionality as the colonizer or colonized, 
there exists an assumption that the person who executes violence is always male and 
the person who is subject to violence is always female. Rainbow Bird collapses such a 
tacit understanding itself as the problem is not to simply replace a gendered position of 
male with female in respect to violence. 
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For example, Ōshiro Tatsuhiro’s Akutagawa prize-winning novella Cocktail 
Party (1967) depicts the typical roles of a sexually violated girl who is victimized and 
forced to keep silent alongside a colonized male who tries to save her from a 
colonizing male by posturing rage toward the rapist.134 In this case, it is impossible to 
narrate another possibility in which the raped girl kills the rapist because it goes 
against the normative grain of “upright” and “pure.” The Rainbow Bird depicts such 
violence forbidden by society. Mayu’s act of setting Higa, the man who forced her to 
prostitute herself, on fire and subsequently killing him in the end, will confuse any 
reader familiar with discourses on violence only from a patriarchal viewpoint. In other 
words, it reveals a power relation in which various possibilities have not been narrated 
in the discourse of rage expressed in a male-centered society and the anti-military 
movement. 
 Mayu’s scene of cruel violence does not end here. At the end of the story, 
she abducts the young daughter of an American soldier and kills her with a knife. 
Because Katsuya was afraid that it would come to light that Mayu killed Higa, 
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Katsuya decided to escape with Mayu. This problem surfaces when Katsuya stops by 
for fast food on the way to northern Okinawa. When he enters the restaurant, he 
notices a US military family on the terrace outside. An American boy and girl joyfully 
play together on a ride. It clearly shows that their young parents also spend time 
peacefully as a happy family. Seeing the peaceful family, Katsuya remembers he also 
played on with similar ride with his sister and had happy days with his own family. 
The American girl was about to flash Katsuya a smile when “Katsuya averted his eyes 
because of her beautifully flushed face and entered the restaurant.”135 However, when 
he came back to his car, he noticed there was something wrong. While Katsuya was in 
the restaurant, Mayu abducted and killed the America girl.  
This scene may be perplexing for most readers since she killed not only a 
gangster like Higa, but also a small child who is assumed to have nothing to do with 
any social relation entangled with violence. Although the scandalous development of a 
“pure girl” killing not only a “cruel adult” such as Higa, but also an “innocent child” 
incites repugnance in the reader, it simultaneously undermines the norm associated 
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with a “cruel adult.” This is because shock and rage tends to be more easily elicited at 
a rape or murder of an “innocent small child” rather than that of an adult. Even when 
an adult female is raped or murdered, the case is often attributed to the victim’s lack of 
self-responsibility. For example, some may question, “Why did she go to such a 
dangerous place?” or “Why did she hang around such a man?”136 These notions of a 
“cruel adult” or adults who must take responsibility for themselves function to conceal 
the fact that most victims of rape or murder related to US military personnel in 
Okinawa are adult females who by far outnumber children. It is important to keep in 
mind that the signifiers “child” and “adult” do not exist in isolation, but discharge a 
complementary function in everyday life. What Mayu’s brutal murder of a small child 
unintentionally reveals is the gesture of self-protection among those in a so-called 
adult society who try to conceal one adult’s cruel violence inflicted against another. 
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The story criticizes a lack of imagination toward the victims, who suffer from the 
violence resulting from military bases on a daily basis. 
4. The Possibility of a Life that Cannot Be Chosen   
 The above sections showed how it is crucial to problematize norms and the 
possibilities for being or existence in Medoruma’s work. Nonetheless, it still remains 
that norms are a necessary condition for the production and maintenance of subject. 
The subject is socially recognized and given self-accountability through norms which 
exist beforehand. By way of Michael Foucault’s writings on the formation of a moral 
subject, Judith Butler writes in Giving an Account of Oneself that “[t]he regime of 
truth offers a framework for the scene of recognition, delineating who will qualify as a 
subject of recognition and offering available norms for the act of recognition.”137 
What Butler emphasizes is that even though norms are the condition for the formation 
of the subject, they at the same time cannot totally determine its being. In other words, 
what Butler emphasizes here is the unfree being who cannot escape from the order of 
norms. 
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The norm does not produce the subject as its necessary 
effect, nor is the subject fully free to disregard the norm that 
inaugurates its reflexivity; one invariably struggles with 
conditions of one’s own life that one could not have chosen. 
If there is operation of agency or, indeed, freedom in this 
struggle, it takes place in the context of an enabling and 
limiting field of constraint. This ethical agency is neither 
fully determined nor radically free. Its struggle or primary 
dilemma is to be produced by a world, even as one must 
produce oneself in some way. This struggle with the 
unchosen conditions of one’s life, a struggle–––and agency–
––is also made possible, paradoxically, by the persistence of 
this primary condition of unfreedom.138 
One struggles with “conditions of one’s own life that one could not have chosen,” that 
is to say, unfree reality. Butler finds radical freedom in the capacity of an act in which 
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one struggles with unfreedom. Therefore, freedom does not exist outside of 
unfreedom. In other words, freedom does not exist outside of norms which enforce a 
governmentality of the self and it does not exist after the fact of unfreedom. It exists 
within the reality that one struggles with norms that inflict various restraints on 
oneself. Freedom is possible “by the persistence of this primary condition of 
unfreedom.” Hence, what Medoruma tries to describe in the Rainbow Bird thorough 
Katsuya and Mayu is that hope literally exists in the act of resisting against social 
norms that restrain oneself. 
 It is important to point out that norms are not only temporarily effective, but 
also continuously effective. Therefore, struggling with norms entails striving against 
the continuous proposition that the fate of a certain subject is predetermined and 
striving for a future which is not deprived by norms. It entails maintaining a future of 
openness. 
 At the same time, what the Rainbow Bird emphasizes is that one’s life is 
largely regulated by norms but not determined as fate. It is created by a “slight 
difference.” Two different norms are the result of this “slight difference.” Conversely, 
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both are contiguous. Both positions are presented in terms of a replaceable 
relationship. “Just like the fluids of small organisms caught in the grip of anxious fear 
suddenly turns into poison,” the girl, who was thought to be powerless, can 
unexpectedly fight back against a rapist. What the rapist and established society are 
afraid of is the uncontrollability of various actions which people take when they 
realize something considered to be fate is revealed to in fact not be fate. That is to say, 
it is revealed to be the victim’s counterattack which is an antagonism. In other words, 
one is afraid of the fact that one cannot control the future as the result of a current 
action. The Rainbow Bird questions norms implicit in the subject of activism and 
brings to light to the antagonism and violence which are never narrated, thought, or 
regarded as illegal within an established society or activist group. The story fulfills the 
undecided present with animated life and opens up the field of future. The story does 
not limit such antagonism/violence to Katsuya, Mayu, or Higa, but describes that 
antagonism/violence as prevailing in everyone in our society. 
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 The fragility of the politics of norms also appears in the scene in which 
Matsuda, Higa’s right-hand man, mocks the prefectural resident rally that protests rape 
of an “innocent child” by US military soldiers. 
Even if many people come out, they can’t do 
anything. That’s why Okinawan people are 
pathetic. If so many people are able to come 
out, why don’t they break through the base 
fences and beat the American soldiers to 
death? All their bitching and complaining 
doesn’t bother the Americans in the slightest.” 
139 
Katsuya had never heard Matsuda’s speaking in such a manner about US military 
bases before, and was surprised that “even Matsuda was interested in the incident.”140 
Following Matsuda, Higa opened up his mouth to speak. “Hang ‘em. They should 
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kidnap a GI kid, strip it naked, and hang it up with wire from a palm tree along Route 
58....That’s if they seriously want to kick the US military out.”141 Katsuya made a 
mental note, “he’s right,” and agrees with him.142 
     On the one hand, there are social movements that advocate justice and peace 
with the backing of various social norms. On the other hand, there is an evil world in 
which people who are cut off from society like Mayu, Katsuya, and Higa, live. 
However, the question here is not whether we agree or disagree with violence. It is 
rather identifying the kind of force the established movement has excluded so that its 
participants can sanitize themselves in effort to conform with the norms of “upright,” 
“pure,” “peace loving,” or “teacher-like.” The novel critically depicts the anti-base 
movement that is predominantly led by teachers, political leaders, and specialized 
activists. Simply put, the story attempts to find possibilities in the movement from a 
wider range of sociality, including those who are categorized as “evil” such as 
Katsuya, Mayu, Higa, or Matsuda, and not limited to a certain group of specialists 
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who are categorized as “good.” Hence, the story is also about the essence of rage that 
surges instantly among ordinary people against social injustice or discrimination 
against problems such as the military bases in Okinawa. Medoruma attempts to locate 
hope in this rage belonging to ordinary Okinawans such as Katsuya, Mayu, or even 
Katsuya’s older brother who has fallen to the decadent life of playing pachinko every 
day. Medoruma invests the hope for change in these individuals in Okinawan society. 
Hence, rage does not belong to only those who have mastered the art of being 
politically correct. 
     The problem is also the ability to question norms. This entails questioning the 
relation currently one has with the Other and one’s reason for existence in a society to 
which one belongs. Critically questioning the conditions of life one has not chosen for 
him/herself, in other words, is, “[to] call into question a regime of truth, where that 
regime of truth governs subjectivation, is to call into question the truth of myself and, 
indeed, to question my ability to tell the truth about myself, to give an account of 
myself.”143 Butler continues: 
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Self-questioning becomes an ethical consequence of 
critique for Foucault, as he makes clear in “What Is 
Critique?” It also turns out that self-questioning of this 
sort involves putting oneself at risk, imperiling the very 
possibility of being recognized by others, since to 
question the norm of recognition that govern what I 
might be, to ask what they leave out, what they might be 
compelled to accommodate, is, in relation to the present 
regime, to risk unrecognizability as a subject or at least to 
become an occasion for posing the questions of who one 
is (or can be) and whether or not one is recognizable.144 
Therefore, struggling with the condition of an unfree life means, in other words, 
questioning norms that recognizes one as a subject and forecloses others as 
unrecognizable beings. It is to take on the risk of shaking society to the core. To 
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critically call into question society and activism that draws its legitimacy from norms 
of justice, as seen in the images of “teachers,” “girls,” and “children,” is to think of a 
violence and irreducible antagonism possessed by the unrecognized other. That is to 
say, it is the thinking of divine violence. 
     However, today’s established social movements criticized in the literature tend 
to term the inevitable and contradictory force against social norms “violence,” and 
then subsequently alienate and sanitize itself from that “violence.” Therefore, the 
violent world of Mayu, Katsuya, and Higa that society excludes is originally nothing 
but society itself. In the story, Katsuya longs for this society absent of the norms that 
filter out individuals such as himself. When Katsuya mumbles to himself, “if only 
things had been a just a hair different, not only Mayu, but even Katsuya, Higa or 
Matsuda might be in a completely different world from now,” he did not wish to 
return to the established society of the present, nor wish to take flight towards a 
“pacifist island.” He recognized a way of life which was not a predetermined fate. He 
sailed against time, reached the past before people lives were divided by norms, and 
recalled the memory of a village. 
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I recalled an old village story I heard from my 
grandparents when I was small. Cape lilac trees lined the 
village market and its shade bustled about with villagers 
who traded goods or idled away in chatter. It was also 
that market where my grandparents met. Near the market 
was an uganju145 where the villagers worshiped, and a 
huge banyan tree with its branches spread out wide. 
Stone walls made with coral taken from either springs 
welling up with sweet water or from the ocean. Fukugi 
trees surrounding the residences. The woods of the 
utaki146 where kaminchu147 sang kamiuta148 and prayed 
all through the night. These all dissolved into the military 
base and transmogrified into a space for runways, 
warehouses, residences, and lawn. 
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     “If only there had been no war, and no forced 
confiscation of the land for US military bases, then the 
Katsuyas of the village would have been born and raised 
on the other side of those fences. If that were the case, 
they would have completely different lives from the ones 
they live now…. Not only Katsuya’s life, but also that of 
his parents and grandparents, and the villagers who lived 
postwar Okinawa—all of their lives would have been 
different.”149 
This village landscape that Katsuya recalls as a utopia is precisely “the ordinary way 
of life, or way of living that already exists as our everyday lives” that Mukai speaks 
of. Then, such everyday lives were destroyed by war and bases. However, Katsuya 
thinks such everyday lives should not be taken as fate but as something which should 
be taken back. He believes that his life today is not unchangeable, but it is changeable 
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with a “slight difference.” His belief overlaps with, of course, his sister’s word “I 
know you can do it.” 
     When Katsuya recalled the past saying that “[i]f only there had been no war, and 
no forced confiscation of the land for US military bases,” he found a different present 
than the one in his here and now. In other words, he located an indeterminate form of 
the future from the recalled past that had been negated by military violence and left 
unrealized. He discovered in this new future a moment that changes the relationship 
with others in the present, including “his parents and grandparents, and the villagers 
who lived postwar Okinawa,” and “not only Mayu, but even Katsuya, Higa or 
Matsuda.” At this moment, memory ceased to simply be a utopia remembered, but 
produced the force to change society and the existing relationships with others. 
Therefore, the evocation of memory as a driving force for upheaval begins to wax over 
with a tinge of violence, which threatens both the established society and subject. 
     The memory becomes threatening not only because it creates an antagonism that 
denies the established subject, but it also refuses recognition from an external state or 
law. In other words, the evocation of memory, (i.e., the recuperation of an everyday 
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life that has otherwise been denied) does not inevitably lead to a state or law’s rescue. 
Certainly, it is undeniable that getting back one’s own everyday life aims for the 
satisfaction of one’s own desire, but nonetheless, such desire is not destined to be 
satisfied by the state or law. Memory does not assume any externality, but rather it 
conjurs up an internal world which exists for its own reason. Katsuya’s father, an idle 
benefactor of military land rents, cast ridicule upon the anti-base movement in front of 
Katsuya in the past saying that “if the anti-base movement is not escalated, then 
military land rents and government subsidies won’t go up.”150 Katsuya’s father knows 
intuitively that even if the anti-base movement is an expression of antagonism and 
desire, it is an expression before the state or law that merely seeks its own recognition. 
As a result, it is founded on an assumption of the law. Seeing through this, he laughed 
at the tacit cooperation between Okinawa’s anti-base movement and the law. 
     By contrast, the archetypal scene of the village Katsuya heard about from his 
grandparents is imagined as everyday life which does not correspond with any 
external law or state. The everyday life of the past, which is imagined in memory, was 
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supposed to bring a sort of social relationship to the present. However, one notices that 
everyday life of the past is different from the existing social relationship of the 
present. The relationship that was supposed to be brought up to the present is 
unrecognizable. Therefore, for those of us living in society today, thinking about and 
narrating a social relationship of the past emerges as danger that shakes the order of an 
established society. 
5. Mean as Ends, Singularity as Universality 
The Rainbow Bird undermines the grounding of a social activist subject by 
calling into question various social norms. Nonetheless, the story does not adopt a 
plot development in which new norms re-emerge from the old, thereby giving birth 
to the recognition of a new subject. Butler writes, “[i]t is also true that certain 
practices of recognition or, indeed, certain breakdowns in the practice of 
recognition mark a site of rupture within the horizon of normativity and implicitly 
call for the institution of new norms, putting into question the givenness of the 
prevailing normative horizon.”151 In other words, she admits that if established 
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norms do not function, there is always a possibility that the established norms can 
be replaced with new one. At the same time, she states that normative horizon is 
exposed to “a critical opening.” She continues: 
Sometimes the very unrecongnizability of the other brings 
about a crisis in the norms that govern recognition. If and 
when, in an effort to confer or to receive a recognition that fails 
again and again, I call into question the normative horizon 
within which recognition takes place, this questioning is part of 
the desire for recognition, a desire that can find no satisfaction, 
and whose unsatisfiability establishes a critical point of 
departure for the interrogation of available norms.152 
Antagonism is expressed precisely when the desire for recognition is not satisfied. In 
this case, the established norms are destroyed, and a movement to create new norms 
that satisfy the desire is summoned. Of course, when such desire is not satisfied, it 
becomes the object of repression. The unrequited desire is posited as an object to be 
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overcome or dissolved. Then, beyond unrequited desire finally comes the satisfaction 
of desire, that is to say, a world of recognition or freedom. 
     However, there is the situation in which satisfaction cannot be achieved even 
when one pines after it. In other words, there is the situation in which desire may 
actually be the desire for a remainder of unrequited desire. “Unsatisfiability” tells the 
story of the lack of freedom amongst subjects of unrequited desire who are not 
recognized. However, from a different viewpoint, such form of life is another way of 
expression the position of a minority subject. One who assumes “unsatisfiability” or 
the lack of freedom is precisely a minority subject who seeks a new norm when he/she 
call into question the established norms. At the same time, as Butler repeatedly states, 
the form of life as “unsatisfiable” is the necessary condition for the minority subject to 
critically think about established norms, express antagonism against them, and move 
towards acquiring recognition. In such a moment, desire is not a lack in the established 
order, but a surplus which overflows outside of its bounds. 
    Traditionally, critical thought on norms and acts of antagonism have simply 
pointed to a process toward a final goal for recognition. Here, means are used to 
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achieve an end. The means are subjugated to a final goal which concludes the process. 
Conversely, the minority subject does not merely struggle with conditions of its own 
difficult life, but this struggle proceeds toward the expression of antagonism and 
subsequent achievement of recognition that nullifies the grounds upon which it 
struggles with such difficulties in the first place. In this sense, it almost seems as if all 
critical and antagonistic acts are merely steps in the overall process that is realized by 
finally arriving to the land of recognition. Here, the process ends and disappears when 
the means are realized in a final goal. One who struggles with hardship ironically 
erases the traces of its life that had once created as if s/he proceeds to erasing the 
footprint that s/he made after s/he walks. 
     However, what we have to call into question is whether “I” who lives through 
this process, “I” who struggles with norms, “I” who displays the capacity to act, “I” 
who lives as minority, will really disappear. Similar to Fanon, Butler tries to rescue a 
modality of desire that does not exist as a simple means or medium that is fated to 
disappear, but as a means that is also an end. In other words, she tried to 
philosophically rescue a modality of desire traditionally understood as the means 
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toward a final goal of recognition, as “a critical point of departure for the interrogation 
of available norms.” Desire that is a means in this sense simultaneously becomes an 
end. 
     One whose desire is not satisfied is exposed to uncertainty. This indeed signifies 
the arrival of “unsatisfiability,” but it also locates the possibility for a variety of ends 
scattered into the future that is viewed from an uncertain present. Here, the future is 
not fate, but it is undecided, unlimited, and universal. Time is open to the future. This 
is exactly where Butler finds “a critical opening” in a form of being that forges a 
critical relationship with norms. A subject who is entangled by the conditions of an 
unfree life of unrequited desire can then place him/herself in a position of 
uncertainness which open up the future by displaying the capacity to struggle with a 
lack of freedom. In this sense, the subject confirms the necessity of his/her own 
existence and becomes free. What is important here is not whether one wins or loses, 
whether one achieves their final goal or not. What is important is that the subject is 
grasped in the midst of struggle where he/she thinks, acts, and struggles for freedom. 
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     The Rainbow Bird depicts the process in which characters confront difficulties, 
try to change they predisposed reality, and struggle with received hardship. However, 
Medoruma chooses not to narrate the story through politicians, intellectuals, 
specialists, or activists who have special knowledge, experience, or training. 
Moreover, he explicitly avoids channeling these struggles through a political party or 
group. The story focuses on an ordinary Okinawans like Katsuya who is generally 
thought to be someone who has nothing to do with the US military base problem. In 
the story Katsuya, does not stop at the critique of social norms. The story also depicts 
the process through which he agonizes over a difficult reality, reflects on himself, and 
changes his thoughts and reforms his own consciousness. The story places an 
emphasis on a character who was formerly indifferent to the problem of bases and 
subsequently cultivates his own critical thinking. Changing oneself means to force one 
to change various relationships with the other upon which one has come to depend on. 
At the same time, since Katsuya’s fluctuating relationship with others and the social 
order causes various criticism and conflicts. Nonetheless, he cannot help but encounter 
anxiety, resistance, and opposition from both within and without. 
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6. The Delighted Rioters 
Katsuya’s father often told this story of the Koza riot to Katsuya: 
I heard of the story that took place before the reversion to Japan in 
which demonstrators wrapped wire rope around the base fences, 
dragged them down, and threw in Molotov cocktails. At that time, 
he [father] apparently went on a rampage without any principles. 
On the one hand, while he ridiculed philosophy or ideology 
because it’s incapable of turning a profit, he nonetheless got the 
young guys from the A-sign establishments together, and then 
attacked a group of Zengunrō153 picketers. He also blended into 
the demonstrators and threw rocks at the riot police. It was from 
such a father that I heard the story of the Koza Riot many times. 
As soon as my father, who was drinking at a bar in the town of 
Koza on that day, got word that US military vehicles were being 
                                                
153 Zengunrō is short for “Zen Okinawa Gunrōdōsha Kumiai” or in English, the “All-Okinawa Military 
Workers Union” which was a US military base workers union of Okinawans that fought for increased 
wages while simultaneously participated in the anti-base movement. 
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burned, he went out of the bar and joined in the riot. In his 
everyday life, he was on the benefitting end of the US military 
bases, but yet he boasted of the fact that he blended into the mob, 
flipped over GI cars, and set fire on them. The mob circled the 
yellow license plates154 flaming with black smoke, applauded, and 
whistled with their fingers. Some of them even danced kachāshi155 
as if they were incited by the heat of the flame. While he talked 
about how formidable the mob was that advanced toward the 
Kadena Air Base gate, he was intoxicated with his own story and 
always murmured at the end, “I wonder if it will happen again?”156 
This is a fictional account of the real life Koza Riot that took place unplanned and 
unanticipated in the middle of the night on December 20, 1970. The enraged multitude 
whistled with their fingers and was overjoyed to see burning military vehicles. 
Children handed over glass bottles filled with gasoline to the mob. A-sign bar 
                                                
154 A metonym for US military vehicles that were identified by their yellow-colored license plates 
bearing the phrase “Keystone of the Pacific.” 
155 “Kachāshi” is a celebratory Okinawan dance that is performed with the dead 
156 Medoruma, Niji no Tori, 102-102. 
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employees started hitting US servicemen who were their customers. Old women 
started dancing the celebratory kachashi with joy. We have to acknowledge that the 
singing and angry voices of the rampaging rioters, who intensify the body’s power of 
activity, did not demand recognition from the state or law in the first place; the riot 
was not a function that sends a message to the state or law. It was a force that did not 
have any purpose vis-à-vis the outside and generated its power for itself. 
     Additionally, since Katsuya’s father, who scornfully stated that, “philosophy or 
ideology...is incapable of turning a profit,” was not tagged as a member of the “anti-
base faction,” the norms of justice versus evil did not carry any importance. At that 
time in Koza, bloody clashes between students who were on the picket line in front of 
the base gate, and A-sign businessmen who collected income from the military 
routinely divided the people. Okinawans who were supposed to be positioned against 
each other politically suddenly began gathering in the main street of the city. All 
factions unintentionally collapsed. People sang songs, raged about, and occupied the 
main street as if they were engaging in a carnival. Here, the method of historical 
   157 
interpretation which seeks to establish an intention before human action as the cause 
of an act completely lost its validity. 
     Sato Izumi describes Katsuya’s father as “a person who lost coherence,” and 
tries to position him within a factional structure.157 However, as descried above, the 
importance of the riot is the fact that the riot was not solely enacted by anti-base 
activists, but also by people who depend on the base economy and support the 
maintenance of such economy. All factions collapsed in the middle of the riot, and the 
rioters raised their voices without depending any exteriority.	
     The reason why the riot appeared as madness is that the mingled effect of joy 
and rage among the people did not have any corresponding relationship with norms of 
political correctness in real politics and movements. It existed as unrepresentable. This 
is why what we have to problematize is this rupture between the norm of political 
correctness and the rioters’ joy. This is precisely what the Rainbow Bird accomplishes. 
What Medoruma attempts to do by describing violence is open up in the present a 
                                                
157 Satō Izumi, “1995-2004 no Chisō Medoruma Shun ‘Niji no Tori’ Ron” in Kakuran suru Shima: 
Jendā teki Shiten, ed., Shinjo Ikuo (Tokyo: Shakai Hyoronsha, 2008), 176. 
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force that has the power to change the relationship with a pre-existing Other. We need 
to keep questioning what it is about language that holds the possibility of involving the 
affects of people into the movement, who ordinarily express themselves with 
statements such as “if the opposition movement doesn’t heat up, the military land rent 
won’t rise, and the government subsidies won’t increase.” What we need to do is 
constitute a broader communality, which is no longer based on norms such as justice 
or injustice. What is important is the need to intervene within the realm of affect, 
which exists one step before an unrecognizable and immanent force becomes power. It 
is a magnetic field where joy infects the air as people become link together. Such an 
unpredictable and exciting communality rages through the so-called “pacified island.” 
     The rainbow bird, which is also the title for this story, has been talked about as 
an illusory bird among American soldiers undergoing anti-guerilla combat training in 
the jungle of Yambaru. As the story goes, they believe in the miracle that if they see it 
in the jungle, they can survive the battlefield. However, if one tells others that he 
caught a glimpse of the bird, the effect of this miracle completely disappears. Even if 
he keeps it secrete and survives, other soldiers of his unit will be annihilated. That is 
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why it is “an unprovable bird in that double sense,” and a socially unrecognizable 
bird.158 Driven by this dream, Katsuya and Mayu are drawn into the darkness of 
Yambaru’s deep forest in order to seek out the unrecognizable rainbow bird. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
158 Medoruma, Ibid., 146. 
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Conclusion 
 As a liminal space that perpetually exists in a precarious relationship to 
sovereign power, the historically-entrenched tendency in Okinawan studies has been 
to posit its liberation either in terms of some form of a recuperation of Okinawa’s 
sovereignty or as a total denial of sovereign power itself. In either case, this thesis is 
different in that it is not fixated on either the affirmation or negation of an external 
power such as sovereignty, but rather developed a consideration for an internal power 
to put into practice a different kind of liberation for Okinawa. In this sense, each 
chapter examined how Kiyota and Medoruma have opened up the possibility of a new 
sense of communality that emerges outside of external sovereign power. 
Chapter 1, appealed to Spinoza in order to foreground an engagement with 
the literature of Kiyota and Medoruma. For human beings who cannot avoid alienation 
and what Butler after Spinoza calls “un-freedom,” conatus is the desire to preserve 
oneself; it is the singularity of the body which is incommensurable with other 
singularities. This incommensurable being is a means in and of itself which must not 
be eliminated for the sake of realizing an end. 
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 After reading Kuroda Kio’s essay on anniya, Chapter 2 provided a close 
reading of Kiyota’s notion of the same in order to criticize the all-island struggle 
which was rooted in the assumption of the private ownership of land. For Kiyota, 
alienation is key. Different from Kawamitsu Shin’ichi, who insisted literature must be 
written in order to defeat a present reality, Kiyota dwelled on defeat as alienation. He 
wrote the poem Maturity, which tried to find meaning in defeat itself and not by 
contrasting it with win victory. 
     Chapter 3 introduced Antonio Negri and Hardt’s discussion on violence. Their 
concept of constituent power is irreducible to the dichotomy of nonviolence and 
counter-violence, and it does not gesture toward an exteriority such as the law or state. 
I then turned to Frantz Fanon in order to deepen the concept of interiority. For Fanon, 
negritude does not posit “a raceless society” as its final goal as suggested by Sartre, 
but locates within itself the same kind of interior movement as described by Hardt and 
Negri. Negritude is not a negative means for a final positive goal. For Fanon, 
negritude is a positive means which suspends the final goal as unforeseeable. Such 
means does not accompany any external model which Fanon powerfully describes in 
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his essay “Algeria Unveiled.” In this essay, Fanon argues that Algerian women take 
their role and mission as revolutionaries “instinctively” without relying on any 
external strategy or doctrine.  
 Chapter 4 introduced Medoruma Shun’s short story “Hope” and focused on 
the key phrase “natural and necessary” in order to show how these words are related to 
Fanon’s articulations of revolutionaries who “instinctively” take up their roles. 
 Chapter 5 focused on the Rainbow Bird as a story about the hardships of a 
life that one does not choose. Through the characters in this story such as Katsuya, 
Mayu, Hisayo, and Hitomi, Medoruma depicts individuals who attempt to overcome 
hardship by themselves. A difficult life demands that each character harness an 
incommensurable force that encounters hardship. Also, such life without exteriority 
overlaps with the Koza Riot precisely because it did not function as a message to the 
external state or law.  
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